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A MOTHER YESTERDAY, BUT NOT TODAY:  
DEFICIENCIES OF THE UNIFORM 
PARENTAGE ACT FOR NON-BIOLOGICAL 
PARENTS IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Angie and Marcie met in college and have been together for five 
years.1  They live in a nice two-story brick house in a small neighborhood 
in the suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio.  Like many typical couples, they 
dream of having a family and growing old together with their children 
and grandchildren.  Eventually, the couple starts a family.  Although 
Angie gives birth to three beautiful children, Marcie is equally a parent.  
She financially supports the children and family, takes the children to 
doctor’s appointments, picks them up from school, attends basketball 
games and dance recitals, helps them with their homework, and tucks 
them in at night.  Marcie never thinks of the children as being anything 
but her own.  But despite Angie and Marcie raising their children 
together as a family, Marcie cannot legalize her relationship with her 
children because Ohio does not recognize second parent adoption. 
Unfortunately, after twelve years, the couple decides to separate.  
For any divorcing couple, a custody battle can be a long and draining 
process, but it generally ends with each parent receiving some type of 
custodial or visitation rights.  However, because Marcie was in a same-
sex partnership not legally recognized by the state of Ohio, Marcie is not 
eligible for custody or visitation rights upon the dissolution of their 
partnership.  Because Angie bore the three children through artificial 
insemination, she is the biological and legal parent of the couple’s three 
children.  Consequently, Marcie has no legal rights over her children and 
cannot obtain rights to control or contribute to their upbringing; nor can 
she obtain a regulatory, court enforced visitation schedule.  Ultimately, 
Marcie loses her children because of her sexual orientation. 
Marriage provides numerous benefits to heterosexual couples that 
are unavailable to same-sex couples, including a presumption of parental 
                                                 
1 This hypothetical is based on In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011).  See In the 
Matter of L.K.M., LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/in-the-
matter-of-lkm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (discussing this case further).  During their seven 
year relationship, the lesbian couple decided to have a child together through artificial 
insemination.  Id.  Two years after the child was born, the couple ended their relationship.  
Id.  Despite raising and financially supporting the child since birth, the non-biological 
mother was denied custody.  In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 308–09.  In a 4–3 decision, the 
Ohio Supreme Court granted sole custody over the child to the biological parent.  Id. 
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status.2  Most states do not allow same-sex marriage, which creates 
difficulty for same-sex couples wanting to be parents.3  In addition to 
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying, many states deny same-sex 
couples the ability to become parents through second parent adoption.4  
Second parent adoption provides the ability for another individual to 
jointly adopt a child without terminating the legal parental status of the 
biological parent.5  Without second parent adoptions, states often do not 
                                                 
2 See An Overview of Federal Rights and Protections Granted to Married Couples, HUM. 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-of-federal-rights-
and-protections-granted-to-married-couples (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (providing 
examples of some of the 1,138 federal benefits same-sex partners cannot receive because of 
existing federal law).  Same-sex marriage is an issue of both state and federal law, because, 
although states may grant the right for same-sex couples to marry, the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”) is a federal law that defines marriage as only between a man and a woman 
for the purpose of any federal law or regulation.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  DOMA further limits 
same-sex couples by stating that “[n]o State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 
State . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).  
Regardless if a state recognizes same-sex marriage, DOMA prohibits that marriage from 
being recognized by the federal government, as well as by other states.  Id. 
3 See, e.g., In re Mullen, 302 N.E.2d at 305 (providing that Ohio statutes do not recognize 
the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship as a parent).  As of January 2013, nine 
states and the District of Columbia currently recognize legal marriage between same-sex 
individuals:  Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, Vermont, and Washington.  Defining Marriage:  Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex 
Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated June 2012).  
Maine, Maryland, and Washington were the first states to recognize same-sex marriage 
through popular vote in the November 2012 election.  Gay Marriage Comes to Maine: Couples 
Wed When Law Takes Effect After Midnight, NBCNEWS, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news 
/2012/12/29/16225220-gay-marriage-comes-to-maine-couples-wed-when-law-takes-effect 
-after-midnight?lite (Dec. 29, 2012).  In addition to these states, Illinois introduced 
legislation in January 2013 to legalize same-sex marriage and to expand the civil union 
rights that the state already permits to same-sex couples.  John O’Connor & Sara Burnett, 
Quick Push for Gay Marriage in Illinois Set Back, YAHOONEWS, http://news.yahoo.com/ 
quick-push-gay-marriage-illinois-set-back-035718597.html (Jan. 13, 2013).  See generally 
Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost Paternity in the Culture of Motherhood:  A Different View of Safe Haven 
Laws, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 81 (2007) (explaining that, in some instances, biological mothers 
may not know what is best for their children). 
4 Parenting Laws:  Second Parent Adoption, HUM. RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (last updated Jan. 18, 
2011).  States like Kentucky, Nebraska, and Ohio do not recognize second parent adoption.  
Id.  Consequently, in a same-sex union, it is difficult for the non-biological parent to obtain 
legal rights over a child.  Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have 
Parental Rights:  A Five-Factor Typology, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 72, 72 (2011).  For example, the lack 
of legal parenting status creates a serious disadvantage when making decisions, like 
serious medical decisions, for the welfare of the child.  Id. 
5 DENIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DOSKOW, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN 
AND GAY COUPLES 84 (Emily Doskow ed., 15th ed. 2010).  The process of second parent 
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consider a non-biological parent, like Marcie, to be a legal parent, 
therefore eliminating a non-biological parent’s ability to gain legal rights 
over a child at the end of a same-sex relationship.6  Consequently, both 
the parent and child lose legal rights they are entitled to as members of a 
parent-child relationship.7 
A non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship has limited 
avenues available in pursuit of legal rights over the child without the 
ability to adopt as a second parent.8  Jurisdictions are greatly divided in 
the treatment of non-biological parents, which results in a lack of 
uniformity among the states for individuals wishing to establish legal 
parental status.9  In part, this division is the result of some states 
recognizing the de facto parent doctrine.10  This doctrine is an equitable 
remedy that allows a non-biological parent to establish legal parental 
rights when the individual has acted as a parent.11  Also, because only 
some states have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), there is a 
further divide among states in defining the word “parent.”12  The UPA is 
an attempt to encourage states to enact uniform legislation for equal 
                                                                                                             
adoption allows a non-biological parent to become a legal parent through adoption, while 
the natural or first adoptive parent retains legal parental status.  Id.  Therefore, states 
permitting second parent adoptions allow both parents in a same-sex couple to be legal 
parents.  Id.  Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes that allow for 
second parent adoptions, and eight states allow a petition for a second parent adoption 
despite no explicit statutory recognition.  Parenting Laws:  Second Parent Adoption, supra note 
4. 
6 See infra Part II.C (illustrating how courts differ when considering the parentage status 
of a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship who is attempting to obtain legal 
rights). 
7 See Miller, supra note 4, at 72, 74 (explaining the financial and legal consequences of 
the failure to establish the legal parent-child relationship); see also D’Arcy L. Reinhard, 
Note, Recognition of Non-Biological, Non-Adoptive Parents in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and 
Utah:  A De Facto Parent Doctrine to Protect the Best Interests of the Child, 13 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 441, 446 (2010) (discussing how research has shown that homosexual parents are able 
to raise happy and healthy children and how the termination of a parent-child relationship 
in such a family structure can be detrimental to the child). 
8 See infra Part II.B (comparing states that have enacted the UPA with states that have 
not to illustrate the various routes states have taken in defining a parent). 
9 See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the various approaches jurisdictions take to grant or 
deny parental rights to the non-biological parent in a same-sex partnership). 
10 See infra Part II.C (illustrating the division in judicial recognition of the de facto parent 
doctrine, based in part on state legislatures’ definitions of a parent in their statutes). 
11 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers:  A Critique of the American Law Institute’s 
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2010) (explaining the 
definition of de facto parent by the American Law Institute, which requires a de facto 
parent to establish three things:  (1) residency; (2) a caretaking role; and (3) that the legal 
parent agreed for the non-parent to become a de facto parent). 
12 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the different ways states have either extended or 
limited the language of the UPA). 
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treatment to children born in and out of marriage.13  Although the UPA 
creates non-discriminatory means to establish parentage of children who 
are born out of marriage, its definition of “parent” fails to recognize 
other types of non-traditional families, including same-sex couples.14  
Therefore, the UPA does not protect same-sex couples when second 
parent adoption is not available.15 
While the UPA is primarily used as a guide for states when enacting 
parentage statutes, it is a critical starting point for how states define a 
legal parent.16  As a result, this Note proposes that the language of the 
UPA be revised to include same-sex couples by recognizing a de facto 
parent and amending its current language in consideration of same-sex 
couples.17  This Note begins by explaining the sources that states use in 
legislative and judicial definitions of parentage:  the UPA and the de 
facto parent doctrine.18   Next, Part II of this Note discusses the state 
statutes that have and have not enacted the UPA, specifically how state 
legislatures define parent.19  It then explains the judicial interpretation of 
those state statutes, which permit or deny legal parental status to a non-
biological parent in a same-sex relationship.20  Part III of this Note looks 
at the benefits and limitations of the UPA in comparison to parental 
statutes of states that have chosen not to enact the UPA.21  Finally, Part 
IV of this Note recommends amending three specific provisions of the 
UPA to better guide state legislatures in defining a legal parent.22 
                                                 
13 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5 (Supp. 
2012). 
14 See infra Part II.A (discussing the current version of the UPA, which fails to recognize 
same-sex relationships in defining a parent). 
15 See infra Part III.A.2 (illustrating the current UPA limitations in protecting non-
biological parents in same-sex relationships). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing how the UPA was created to be a model statute to create 
uniformity among states in parenting statutes). 
17 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the UPA that would legally recognize a de 
facto parent and establish a non-biological parent’s legal rights when consenting to 
artificial insemination). 
18 See infra Part II.A (presenting the valuable provisions of the UPA that impact the 
determination of parentage and discussing the definition of a de facto parent). 
19 See infra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches legislatures have taken in 
defining a parent and determining child custody within the confines of the UPA or without 
the guidance of the UPA). 
20 See infra Part II.C (explaining judicial decisions to extend equitable doctrines of 
psychological parenting to grant custody to a non-biological parent in a same-sex 
relationship under the confines of statutory language). 
21 See infra Part III (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of those states that 
have enacted the UPA). 
22 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the UPA that would better guide states in 
enacting statutes that are beneficial to same-sex parents and addressing potential 
problems). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
The ability to establish one’s self as the legal parent over a child is 
essential for both the parent and the child.23  Although not legally 
binding, the UPA guides state legislatures in creating statutes to define a 
legal parent.24  States also look to common law equitable doctrines when 
deciding to expand the definition of a parent to include a de facto 
parent.25  First, Part II.A explains the language of the UPA used by state 
legislatures in creating parenting statutes.26  Part II.B discusses the 
legislative enactment of the UPA, as well as statutes in states that have 
chosen not to enact the UPA, illustrating the differences in the definition 
of a parent.27  Finally, Part II.C explains the judicial interpretations of 
statutes defining a parent when determining whether to grant non-
biological parents in same-sex relationships legal parental rights.28 
                                                 
23 See Miller, supra note 4, at 72–73 (explaining that providing the social parent with legal 
parental status is beneficial in providing security to the family situation, such as the ability 
to handle medical situations or estate issues).  By being defined as a legal parent, an 
individual is granted rights over her child that are otherwise unavailable, such as the 
ability to obtain custody or to make medical decisions.  Id.  Legal parental status will 
provide rights to a child as well, like the right to inherit from such parents and the right to 
receive financial support from the non-biological parent.  See MARK STRASSER, SAME-SEX 
UNIONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 91–92 (2011) (discussing that the failure by a court to 
establish a non-biological parent as a legal parent creates a financial disadvantage, because 
the non-parent is no longer required to financially support the child at the end of a 
relationship). 
24 See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) § 7:23, at 645–46, in 
LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2d ed. 2005) (discussing that, although the UPA is not 
universally recognized because states are not mandated to enact it, many states use the 
UPA as the exclusive means to establish parentage); see also Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The 
Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines:  How Should the Uniform Parentage Act 
Define “Parent”?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691, 713–14 (2009) (discussing the development of the 
UPA and its guiding principles on states).  The following states have enacted some version 
of the UPA:  Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  KRAMER, supra, at 646. 
25 See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:  Parentage 
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 223 
(2009) (discussing a Washington court case, which used the de facto parent doctrine to 
grant custody to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship).  A de facto parent is an 
equitable common law doctrine that recognizes a person as a legal parent when there is a 
parent-like relationship.  See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2009) (discussing the 
ALI’s definition of the de facto parent doctrine). 
26 See infra Part II.A (explaining the UPA and the important provisions that implicate 
issues for same-sex parents). 
27 See infra Part II.B (providing examples of how states liberally or conservatively enact 
parenting statutes, both within and outside the confines of the UPA). 
28 See infra Part II.C (illustrating how courts rely on the language of statutes to determine 
the ability of granting parenting rights to non-biological parents of same-sex couples). 
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A. The Uniform Parentage Act and the Definition of a De Facto Parent 
The UPA was first approved in 1973 to create uniformity among 
states in the establishment of parentage.29  During this time, state statutes 
often discriminated against children born out of marriage; therefore, the 
UPA was created to be a model statute to define parentage without the 
consideration of marital status.30  As a result of medical advances in 
conception, the UPA was further amended in 2000 and 2002 to include a 
definition of a parent in relation to a child who was conceived through 
artificial insemination.31  Although the UPA does not exclusively define a 
parent on the basis of marital status, the current UPA only recognizes the 
conception of a child in heterosexual relationships, because it defines 
parentage strictly in terms of a man and a woman.32 
                                                 
29 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5–6 (Supp. 
2012).  During this time, many states differentiated between children born in and out of 
marriage, which resulted in a significant disadvantage for children born out of marriage.  
Id.  Aside from the UPA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws addresses various topics, including parentage and probate, to create model statutes 
for states.  Id.  The Commissioners create model state laws as a way to promote uniformity 
among states, finding it a necessity as the mobility between states has increased for 
individuals.  About the ULC, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative. 
aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).  Uniformity among state laws 
in parentage is important as mobility is increasing.  See STRASSER, supra note 23, at 88 
(discussing the importance in uniformity for parenting laws in order to prevent 
complications for parents and children in same-sex couples). 
30 See 1 KAREN MOULDING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1:15, at 96 (2012) 
(stating the UPA’s purpose was to eliminate laws that defined children as “illegitimate” 
and therefore deprived these children of certain rights, such as inheritance rights).  The 
UPA was originally created after the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment required legislation to treat children born in and out of 
marriage equally and refused to allow a distinction in laws based on the marital status of 
parents.  See Rohlf, supra note 24, at 713 (discussing the intended purpose of the UPA). 
31 David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:  Tensions Between Legal, Biological, 
and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 134 (2006).  The 2000 
amendment revised the original UPA’s limitation of artificial insemination procedures by a 
licensed physician.  Id.  In 2002, the UPA further changed this provision to include a 
presumption of fatherhood regardless of marital status or biological link to the child.  Id.  
Although family structures are changing, the law has been slow to reform to the needs of 
such changes, including consideration of same-sex couples.  Id. at 133–34. 
32 See generally Nicole L. Parness, Note, Forcing a Square into a Circle:  Why Are Courts 
Straining to Apply the Uniform Parentage Act to Gay Couples and Their Children?, 27 
WHITTIER L. REV. 893, 907 (2006) (explaining that the UPA was not created with 
homosexuals in mind, because it fails to apply to same-sex couples and does not recognize 
parental relationships within these couples).  The UPA does not contain the words “gay,” 
“lesbian,” “homosexual,” or “domestic partnerships,” including within the UPA provision 
regarding artificial insemination.  See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (providing the UPA provision that defines the 
establishment of parentage in the context of artificial insemination procedures).  The 
language of the current UPA clearly indicates it was created to determine parentage of 
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Currently, the UPA defines a “mother” (a female as a legal parent) as 
a biological or adoptive relationship between a parent and a child.33  A 
mother-child relationship is established only through a woman’s giving 
birth or through legal adoption.34  The father-child relationship is 
defined by the same traditional definitions of a parent, through biology 
or an adoption, but expands the definition to include presumptions of 
paternity beyond these links.35  For example, section 204 of the UPA 
states that a legal father-child relationship may be established if “for the 
first two years of the child’s life, [the individual claiming paternity] 
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the 
child as his own.”36  Section 204 also presumes a legal father-child 
relationship for a child born within a marriage.37  In both of these 
                                                                                                             
children born in heterosexual relationships.  Parness, supra, at 907.  For example, section 
201 of the UPA, Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship, explains the definition of a 
mother and father relationship with a child, failing to provide the ability to establish two 
women or two men as parents.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).  In addition, only a male may be established as a father by 
presumption, thereby denying the ability for a second female to be established as a mother 
by a similar process.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 
(Supp. 2012). 
33 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). 
34 Id.  The provision defining the legal mother-child relationship states, “(a) The mother-
child relationship is established between a woman and a child by:  (1) the woman’s having 
given birth to the child . . . ; (2) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity; [or] (3) adoption 
of the child by the woman . . . .”  Id. 
35 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(b) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).  The 
provision establishing a legal father-child relationship goes beyond a traditional biological 
or adoptive parent because it allows for a presumption of paternity.  Id. 
36 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012). 
37 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2012).  
This provision of the UPA provides for a presumption of paternity in the following 
circumstances: 
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: 
 (1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and 
the child is born during the marriage; 
 (2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and 
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by 
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce [, or after a 
decree of separation]; 
 . . . .  
 (4) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child 
married each other in apparent compliance with law, whether or not 
the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily 
asserted his paternity of the child, and; 
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state agency 
maintaining birth records]; 
(B) he agreed to and is named as the child’s father on the 
child’s birth certificate; or 
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provisions, a legal parental relationship is established without the male 
proving his biological or adoptive link to the child.38 
In addition to section 204, section 703 of the UPA provides for the 
presumption of paternity in situations in which a male intends to be a 
father of the child conceived through artificial reproduction.39  This 
provision further allows for the establishment of a legal father-child 
relationship without the presumed father donating his sperm to conceive 
the child.40  Although the UPA allows a presumption of paternity, no 
provision specifically addresses the issue of a de facto parent as a legal 
parent.41  In addition to the UPA, legislatures and courts have used 
equitable remedies, such as the de facto parent doctrine, to define a legal 
parent despite the UPA failing to recognize it.42 
The de facto parent doctrine is an equitable remedy used to establish 
a legal parent when an individual has in essence acted like a parent, but 
                                                                                                             
(C) he promised in a record to support the child as his 
own . . . . 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).  
Therefore, under this provision, a male may be presumed to be a legal parent without a 
biological link, as long as there is a marriage.  Id.  This is the only provision in which 
marriage is applied to determine parentage, but it is not the sole avenue to establish 
parentage.  Id.; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 
(Supp. 2012). (defining parent without considering marital status). 
38 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012). 
39 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  
Section 703 states, “A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction 
by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting 
child.”  Id.  Therefore, the UPA establishes paternity for the intended father rather than 
granting paternity to the actual sperm donor.  Id. 
40 Id. 
41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (establishing 
a legal father-child relationship through a presumption rather than a biological or adoptive 
tie).  The UPA has not recognized de facto parentage despite recommendations.  Smith v. 
Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2009); see also Rohlf, supra note 24, at 705 (explaining how 
scholars have recommended changing the UPA to permit third parties who have a parent-
like relationship with a child to establish legal parental status).  Although the Act does not 
explicitly reference de facto parent, section 204 does recognize a type of parent comparable 
to the definition of a de facto parent for a father-child relationship by allowing paternity to 
be established when a male holds the child out as his own.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) 
§ 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).  Even though the UPA does not 
recognize a de facto parent relationship, the commission creating uniform laws has 
recognized such a relationship in other model statutes.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-116 
(amended 2010) (recognizing equitable adoption for purposes of probate). 
42 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (applying the de facto parent 
doctrine as an equitable remedy where the enactment of the UPA left gaps in the definition 
of a parent). 
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there is no biological link to the child.43  Although courts may vary as to 
the specific requirements necessary to establish de facto parental status, 
the general requirements of the doctrine have been defined by the 
American Law Institute as a parent who has lived with a child for a 
given amount of time and has essentially acted as a parent without 
having the legal obligation to do so.44  In addition to judicial recognition 
of a de facto parent, some states have statutorily defined a de facto 
parent as a legal parent despite the UPA’s failure to recognize the 
doctrine.45  While some states statutorily or judicially recognize the de 
facto parent doctrine, others do not.46  The division in states granting 
legal rights to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship is 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., id. at 176 (holding that the de facto parent doctrine was available to establish 
legal parental status for a third party).  The court stated the following requirements to 
establish de facto parental status: 
(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like 
relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same 
household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood 
without expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner 
has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have 
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental 
in nature. 
Id. 
44 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c), at 118 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  The ALI is 
comparable to that of the Commissioners who have created the UPA.  ALI Overview, THE 
AM. LAW INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2012).  It is composed of lawyers, judges, and law professors who create model 
statutes and make other suggestions to the status of the law.  Id.  The ALI’s definition of de 
facto parent provides: 
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a 
parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than 
two years, 
 (i) lived with the child and, 
 (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, 
and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child 
relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any 
legal parent to perform caretaking functions, 
 (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking 
functions for the child, or 
 (B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions 
at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child 
primarily lived. 
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra, § 2.03(1)(c), at 118. 
45 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (enacting, within its state statutes, 
the ability to establish oneself as a de facto parent and, thus, a legal parent). 
46 See infra Part II.C (comparing court decisions that have recognized a de facto parent to 
those states that fail to apply the doctrine to non-biological parents). 
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dependent on the legislative definition of a parent and the judicial 
interpretations of such statutes.47 
B. Legislative Definitions of a Parent 
Legislative decisions have led to states differing in the definition of a 
parent.48  Only some states have enacted the UPA.49  Other states choose 
to define parentage without enacting the UPA.50  Adding to the division 
among states, some states have liberally defined a parent within their 
statutes, whereas other states conform to traditional definitions of a 
parent.51  As a result, granting legal rights to a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship is heavily dependent on the language of the 
statute.52 
1. State Statutory Enactments of the UPA 
The UPA is a model for states, and some states have chosen to enact 
the UPA with its current language while other states have enacted 
altered versions of the UPA.53  In states that have altered the language of 
                                                 
47 See infra Part II.B–C (illustrating the inconsistency among states in enactment of 
parental statues and interpretation of such statutes to allow for the de facto parent 
doctrine). 
48 See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011) (reasoning that the state legislature 
made the conscious decision to adopt de facto parent within its UPA).  But see Jones v. 
Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (discussing that it is the role of the legislature to 
determine the applicable laws, and Utah’s legislature has yet to recognize a de facto parent 
as a legal parent, therefore, it was not up to the court to create it). 
49 See supra note 24 (detailing the states that have enacted the UPA).  Other jurisdictions 
have not adopted the UPA in its entirety but have used its language or certain provisions of 
the UPA in their statutes.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2011) (using 
similar language as the UPA section 703 but only granting a husband legal status as a 
father when consenting to the artificial insemination of the wife). 
50 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2008) (recognizing de facto parents 
despite not enacting the UPA); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West 2011) (failing to adopt 
the UPA but allowing a third party standing to seek custody). 
51 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (providing a legal parent-child 
relationship to be established through de facto parent, thereby not requiring a biological or 
adoptive link), with LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 116(17) (2004) (defining parent by a 
biological or adoptive tie). 
52 See Smith, 16 A.3d at 924 (applying the de facto doctrine to a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship, because the legislature clearly intended the application in these 
circumstances based on language of the statute); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009) (refusing to extend the de facto doctrine because the legislature did not 
explicitly provide for the doctrine within the statute); Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (refusing to 
apply the de facto doctrine based on statutory language). 
53 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (adopting the majority of the UPA but 
including new provisions, including the definition of de facto parent); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 210.822 (West 2010) (enacting the UPA-like provisions, but omitting section 204(a)(5) of 
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the UPA, some use expansive language to define a parent, which is 
inclusive of same-sex couples.54  Other states conservatively alter the 
UPA’s language to limit the rights of same-sex couples.55 
Some states choose to enact the UPA and liberally modify the 
definition of a parent beyond traditional definitions.56  One way states 
have done this is to include gender-neutral terminology within their 
provisions.57  For example, Washington is a state that has liberally 
amended its version of the UPA.58  First, it uses gender-neutral language, 
where the original UPA uses “man” and “woman.”59  This is illustrated 
in Washington’s enactment of UPA section 703.60  In section 703 of the 
original UPA, a male is legally recognized as a parent to a child 
conceived by artificial insemination, despite not being the sperm donor, 
so long as he consents and intends to be the parent of that child.61  
Washington amended this provision to state, “A person who provides 
gametes for, or consents in a signed record to assisted reproduction with 
another person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the 
                                                                                                             
the UPA, which allows a presumption of paternity when a man holds the child out as his 
own). 
54 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (including de facto parent within the definition 
of a parent-child relationship); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011 et seq. (West 2005) 
(including gender-neutral language and recognizing same-sex relationships). 
55 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (eliminating the presumption of paternity available 
in the current UPA when a man holds a child out as his own); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-
204, 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (amending the presumption of paternity language of sections 
204 and 703 of the UPA). 
56 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) 
(“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a women . . . is a 
parent of the resulting child.”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710 (“A person who 
provides gametes for, or consents in a signed record to assisted reproduction with another 
person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the resulting 
child.”). 
57 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011 et seq. (enacting the UPA with gender-
neutral provisions). 
58 Id.  The Washington legislature amended its version of the UPA in 2011 not only to 
include gender-neutral terms, but it has also included domestic partnerships in certain 
provisions in order to provide any parent the ability to seek the determination of 
parentage.  SCOTT J. HORENSTEIN, Scope and Purpose of Parentage Action, in 21 WASHINGTON 
PRACTICE SERIES, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 45.1, at 10 (Scott Horenstein 
ed., 2011). 
59 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710.  For example, under the adoption of the UPA’s 
artificial insemination provision, Washington’s UPA allows for parentage to be established 
by “[a] person who provides gametes for, or consents . . . to assisted reproduction with 
another person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the 
resulting child.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (providing that only a male may establish 
parentage over a child conceived through artificial insemination by consent). 
60 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710. 
61 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). 
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parent of the resulting child.”62  Accordingly, Washington’s provision of 
section 703 is expansive to include a presumption of parentage to both 
males and females.63 
Another way states have liberally altered their enactment of the UPA 
is to include language like “domestic partnerships.”64  Although the UPA 
does not solely base parentage on marital status, there are provisions 
that use the term “marriage” as a basis for the presumption of 
paternity.65  Because same-sex couples are unable to marry in many 
states, this presumption cannot apply.66  Washington further modified its 
version of the UPA to include the term “domestic partnership” within 
this provision.67  When the UPA does use the term marriage as a way to 
establish parentage, states like Washington allow a domestic partnership 
                                                 
62 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710; see Kelly M. O’Bryan, Comment, Mommy or Daddy 
and Me:  A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 
60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2011) (explaining that, prior to amending its language, the 
provisions of Washington’s enactment of the UPA could not be applied to same-sex 
couples because of the gender specific terms). 
63 See supra note 58 (discussing Washington’s enactment of the UPA to include both 
gender-neutral terms and the words domestic partnerships in order to be inclusive of 
same-sex couples establishing parentage). 
64 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.051(2) (“The provisions in this chapter apply to 
persons in a domestic partnership to the same extent they apply to persons in a marriage, 
and apply to persons of the same sex who have children together to the same extent they 
apply to persons of the opposite sex who have children together.”).  The current language 
of the UPA does use marriage as one method to establish a presumption of paternity of a 
child-parent relationship, stating a “man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he 
and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the 
marriage . . . .”  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 
2012).  Washington has amended its UPA to state: 
(1) In the context of a marriage or a domestic partnership, a person is 
presumed to be the parent of a child if: 
(a) The person and the mother or father of the child are married to 
each other or in a domestic partnership with each other and the child is 
born during the marriage or domestic partnership . . . . 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1). 
65 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).  
Although the UPA does not require marriage as a prerequisite to establish parentage, it 
does provide that marriage is one way to establish a presumption of paternity.  UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2012). 
66 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the limited number of states that 
permit same-sex couples to legally marry). 
67 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.051.  The old version of Washington’s UPA was an 
exact version of the original UPA; therefore, the gender specific terms and the presumption 
for marriage could not be applied to determine parentage for same-sex couples.  See, e.g., In 
re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (finding that the current version of the 
state’s enactment of the UPA did not allow for it to be applied to same-sex couples but did 
allow for the application of the de facto parent doctrine in such circumstances). 
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to establish parentage under the same conditions, therefore permitting 
the presumption to apply to same-sex couples.68 
Finally, states have amended the UPA by defining a de facto 
parent.69  Although the current version of the UPA does not explicitly 
recognize a de facto parent, some states, like Delaware, have chosen to 
define a de facto parent as a legal parent within its enacted version of the 
UPA.70  Section 201 of the original UPA defines how to establish a 
parent-child relationship.71  Under the Delaware UPA, this provision 
provides that either mother or father may be established as a de facto 
parent by meeting the requirements.72  Therefore, Delaware allows a 
parent-child relationship regardless of gender and biological link.73  
Despite some states expanding the definition of a parent in their enacted 
version of the UPA to include same-sex parents, other states have done 
                                                 
68 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(2) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 
2012) (allowing a male to be presumed legal father over a child in certain circumstances, 
like marriage); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (using similar presumption 
circumstances as the UPA, but changing the language to include domestic partnership; 
therefore a person of either sex can be a presumed a legal parent when the child was 
conceived during a domestic partnership). 
69 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009) (defining de facto parent as a legal 
parent within its enactment of the UPA). 
70 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 
(Supp. 2012) (failing to explicitly recognize a de facto parent as a legal parent but allowing 
for presumption of paternity in certain circumstances), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-
201(c) (adopting the UPA to include de facto parent within the definition of legal parent, 
which is applicable to both females and males). 
71 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).  This 
provision allows a mother-child relationship to be established only when a female is the 
biological mother or adoptive mother.  Id.  As for fathers, this provision of the UPA allows 
paternity to be established on the basis of a presumption set out in section 204 and section 
703 of the UPA.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 
(Supp. 2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 
2012).  This presumption of parentage is not available for females attempting to establish a 
legal parent-child relationship.  Id. 
72 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c).  A de facto parent under the statute will be 
established if the court determines that the individual: 
 (1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or 
parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship between the child and the de facto parent; 
 (2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term 
is defined in [section] 1101 of this title; and 
 (3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to 
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child 
that is parental in nature. 
Id. 
73 See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 923–24, 933 (Del. 2011) (holding that Delaware’s 
de facto parent statute enabling a non-biological mother to have joint custody was 
constitutional). 
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the opposite and used restrictive language in altering their version of the 
UPA.74 
Some states have chosen to conservatively enact the UPA and alter 
the language to uphold traditional definitions of a parent that restrict 
same-sex parents.75  To achieve this, states restrict the application of the 
UPA by removing or editing the language of provisions that allow for a 
presumption of paternity.76  For example, although Ohio has only 
enacted portions of the UPA, it has eliminated the presumption of 
paternity provisions available under the UPA.77  In enacting section 703 
of the UPA, the Ohio legislature utilized “husband,” whereas the 
original UPA uses “male.”78  In the original UPA, the provision allows 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010) (instituting a requirement of marriage 
that is not found in the UPA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (amending the 
presumption of paternity language of UPA section 703 to restrict the ability for presumed 
paternity only within marriage). 
75 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (using comparably similar language to the UPA’s 
section 703 for artificial reproduction, but amending the provision to only allow a husband 
to be a father without a biological donation, as long as he consents to his wife’s procedure).  
See generally Emmalee M. Miller, Note, Are You My Mother? Missouri Denies Custodial Rights 
to Same-Sex Parent, 75 MO. L. REV. 1377, 1384–85 (2010) (noting that, despite changes in the 
2002 UPA, some states have enacted different versions of the UPA, including Missouri, to 
impose a marital requirement under certain provisions of the UPA).  In promoting the 
traditional framework for family—a husband and wife—some argue that same-sex couples 
should not raise children because it denies children the fundamental right of being raised 
by both a mother and father.  Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man 
and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (2007). 
76 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (amending the UPA provision section 703 to only 
allow a presumption of paternity within artificial insemination for a husband); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2011) (amending its enactment of section 703, as Missouri has, 
to only allow a presumption of paternity for husbands); see also White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 
1, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (providing that Missouri’s enactment of the UPA has eliminated 
the presumption available under the original UPA when a male holds a child out as his 
own).  See generally Miller, supra note 75, at 1385–87 (discussing how Missouri adopted its 
UPA to include marital terms, thereby placing restrictions on presumptions for paternity). 
77 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §  3111.95.  But see supra Part II.A (discussing the provisions of 
the UPA that provide for a presumption of paternity in certain circumstances). 
78 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95.  The provision states: 
 (A) If a married woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial 
insemination and if her husband consented to the artificial 
insemination, the husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the 
natural father of a child conceived as a result of the artificial 
insemination, and a child so conceived shall be treated in law and 
regarded as the natural child of the husband. 
Id. § 3111.95(a).  See, e.g., In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ohio 2002) (reasoning that the 
language of the statute could not be applied to same-sex couples, and therefore it 
precluded the non-biological parent from fitting within the definition of parent). 
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for a male to be a presumed the father regardless of marital status.79  By 
amending the language of these provisions, Ohio and similar states have 
precluded the UPA from being applied to non-married parents.80 
In addition to adding marital language to the UPA, other states have 
removed the provision that allows for a presumption of paternity when a 
male holds the child out as his own.81  Missouri and other states have 
eliminated this provision, thereby prohibiting a presumption of 
parentage that is comparable to a de facto parent.82  As a result, these 
states have limited the application of the UPA, because it cannot be 
applied to non-martial or non-traditional families.83  Just as states 
enacting the UPA have amended it to provide for a broad or narrow 
definition of a parent, states choosing not to enact the UPA have 
similarly differed in defining a parent.84 
2. Statutory Definitions of a Parent Without the UPA 
States choosing not to enact the UPA have various statutory 
approaches in defining a legal parent and child custody.85  But just like 
states enacting the UPA, these states can liberally define a parent to grant 
legal rights to non-biological parents.86  On the contrary, other states 
                                                 
79 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the UPA 
that allow a male to be established as a legal father because of a presumption, even when 
not married to the child’s mother). 
80 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95.  Like Ohio, Missouri and Utah only permit husbands 
to be the presumed father of a child conceived through artificial insemination.  MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 210.824; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (West 2012).  See, e.g., White, 293 S.W.3d at 
11 (explaining that Missouri’s legislature intended for presumptions to apply in the context 
of marriage). 
81 See supra text accompanying note 36 (discussing section 204(a)(5), which allows a male 
to be the presumed father when he “held the child as his own”). 
82 MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75B-15-204; see, e.g., White, 293 S.W.3d 
at 10 (explaining that the legislature intentionally left out the presumption of paternity 
when a father holds a child as his own). 
83 See White, 293 S.W.3d at 11 (holding Missouri’s UPA could not be applicable to same-
sex couples); see also Miller, supra note 75, at 1385 (discussing that Missouri has made 
significant changes in its enactment of the UPA to limit its application). 
84 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how non-UPA states have defined parent in their child-
custody statutes). 
85 Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (granting custody only to legal parents 
unless there is substantial harm to the child), with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West 
2011) (allowing non-biological individuals the ability to seek custody over a child). 
86 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2008) (allowing a de facto custodian to 
establish custody of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (2006) (providing for a de 
facto custodian, within a child custody statute, who has the same ability as a biological or 
adoptive parent in seeking custody over a child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) 
(allowing for third parties to seek custody over a child and be granted joint custody along 
with a biological or adoptive parent). 
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have conservatively defined a parent to restrict the legal rights of non-
biological parents.87 
Some states not enacting the UPA have created statutes that 
expansively define a parent by including a de facto parent as a legal 
parent.88  For example, Kentucky’s legislature has defined a de facto 
parent as a legal parent.89  Kentucky recognizes a de facto parent when it 
is demonstrated that he or she is the primary caregiver and financial 
supporter of the child for a required period of time.90  In addition, the 
statute specifies that a “court shall determine custody in accordance with 
the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to 
each parent and to any de facto custodian.”91  Consequently, a non-
                                                 
87 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (granting custody only to legal parents unless 
there is a showing of substantial harm to the child); Whitman v. Williams, 6 So. 3d 852, 853 
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding natural parents have “parental primacy” that gives the parent 
a “paramount right to custody of a child, and may be deprived of such right only for 
compelling reasons” (quoting Wilson v. Paul, 997 So. 2d 572, 574 (La. Ct. App. 2008))). 
88 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5(c)–(d) (providing for a de facto custodian to establish 
custody of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (providing a de facto custodian the 
ability to seek custody despite no biological or adoptive link). 
89 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a).  The statutes defines de facto custodian as: 
[A] person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to 
have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a 
child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months 
or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of 
one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or 
has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services. 
Id.  Further, “[o]nce a court determines that a person meets the definition of de facto 
custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is 
given to each parent . . . .”  Id. § 403.270(1)(b). 
90 Id. § 403.270; see, e.g., Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 573–74 (Ky. 2010) 
(explaining that a de facto custodian must show that he or she was the primary caregiver 
rather than simply parenting alongside another parent); Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805, 
807 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Kentucky’s de facto custodian statute and explaining it 
requires “actual possession” of the child to establish the relationship).  Because of such, the 
statute therefore limits the applicability of de facto custodian status.  See Mullins, 317 
S.W.3d at 574, 579 (reasoning the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship could not 
establish de facto parental status, but was able to demonstrate that the natural mother had 
made an effective waiver of parenting status to allow for joint custody over the child). 
91 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2).  In addition to Kentucky, Indiana also recognizes a 
de facto custodian for child custody purposes.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5.  It provides 
that, when a child is in the care of a de facto custodian, the court will look at the nature and 
extent of the relationship with the de facto custodian when considering an action for 
custody against the natural parent.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5(c)–(d).  Therefore, a court 
must consider the wishes of a de facto custodian in Indiana when determining custody 
versus the wishes of a natural parent.  Id.  But, in Indiana, the de facto parent must 
overcome the presumption of the natural parent when attempting to gain custody.  In re 
Guardianship of L.L, 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
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biological parent may be a legal parent when able to establish himself or 
herself as a de facto parent.92 
In addition to defining a de facto parent, these non-UPA states have 
enacted broad child custody statutes to allow for persons not of legal 
parental status the ability to seek custody.93  North Carolina’s legislature 
has taken this approach.94  North Carolina does not expressly recognize a 
de facto parent, but it allows a third party, who is not a legal parent, to 
seek custody.95  Further, the statute allows for two persons to be granted 
custody of a child, thereby allowing a non-biological parent of a same-
sex relationship to obtain joint custody of the child with a biological 
parent.96  Although some non-UPA states’ legislatures provide avenues 
for non-biological parents seeking legal rights, other non-UPA states 
have taken the contrary approach to restrict parenting rights solely to 
traditional parents.97 
In contrast to states like Kentucky and North Carolina, other non-
UPA states’ statutes limit same-sex parents’ ability to obtain custody 
because the restrictive language is only applicable to heterosexual 
parents.98  For example, in Louisiana the legal relationship between a 
parent and a child is only established by being the biological mother or 
father or through legal adoption.99  Presumption of paternity only 
                                                 
92 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270. 
93 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to seek 
custody over a child). 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  The statute states, “Any parent, relative, or other person . . . claiming the right to 
custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such 
child . . . .”  Id.  In addition, any order for custody by such a person will be determined by 
what “will best promote the interest and welfare of the child . . . .”  Id. § 50-13.2(a).  See, e.g., 
Regan v. Smith, 509 S.E.2d 452, 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that parties seeking 
custody have equal standing, because there is no burden of proof on third parties when 
determining the best interest of the child in determining custody). 
96 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b).  This part of the statute states that an order for 
custody may “grant custody to two or more persons.”  Id.  See, e.g., Patterson v. Taylor, 535 
S.E.2d 374, 378 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[North Carolina’s joint custody statute] is relatively 
unrestrictive, requiring a court ordering ‘joint custody’ to focus on the best interests and 
welfare of the child, but otherwise allowing the court substantial latitude in fashioning a 
‘joint custody’ arrangement.”). 
97 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (granting custody to a third party only 
when there is a showing of substantial harm due to the legal parents having custody). 
98 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (West 2006) (recognizing de facto parents and, 
thereby, allowing a non-biological parent of a same-sex couple to establish legal parental 
status).  But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (restricting the granting of child custody to 
parents unless there is a substantial harm to the child). 
99 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184, 185.  Louisiana does not permit the establishment of a 
legal parent outside a biological or adoptive parent.  Id.  The state does allow for a 
presumption of paternity when the child was born within 300 days of marriage; therefore, 
the husband is the presumed father.  Id. art. 185.  The definition of a parent within 
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applies in the context of a legally recognized marriage.100  Therefore, the 
definition of a legal parent is severely limited.101  In addition, Louisiana 
child custody statutes are restrictive and only permit courts to award 
custody to non-legal parents in circumstances where granting custody to 
the legal parents creates a substantial harm to the child.102  Because of 
this strict statutory language, same-sex couples have difficulty obtaining 
legal rights over their child in Louisiana.103 
States’ legislatures greatly differ in defining a legal parent, as well as 
in the determination of custody.104  States enacting the UPA may alter its 
language to include a more expansive or restrictive definition of a legal 
parent.105  Similarly, non-UPA states also differ in formulating parentage 
                                                                                                             
Louisiana’s statute is important because its child custody statutes define the ability to grant 
custody in terms of whether one is considered a parent.  Id. art. 133.  The legislature has 
provided that child custody be granted only between the parents.  Id. art. 132.  The statute 
only allows the granting of custody to a non-parent in circumstances where it “would 
result in substantial harm to the child.”  Id. art. 133.  Because the statute limits the definition 
of marriage, the child custody statute is limited in application to same-sex couples.  See id. 
art. 185 (explaining that presumption of paternity is limited to within a marriage). 
100 Id. art. 185. 
101 See id. art. 184, 185 (providing legal parental rights only to married women who can 
prove maternity by a preponderance of the evidence). 
102 See, e.g., Jones v. Coleman, 18 So. 3d 153, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting article 
133 to mean “[w]hen the parent competes with a nonparent of the child, the parent’s right 
to custody is superior unless the parent is unable or unfit, having forfeited parental rights” 
(citing Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974))).  Furthermore, the Louisiana court has 
interpreted the statutes to invalidate parenting agreements between a parent and a non-
parent, despite authority to uphold a parenting agreement in the context of a divorce, 
thereby further limiting remedies for same-sex couples.  See id. at 163 (stating that the 
purpose of the statute was to exclusively promote parenting agreements between legal 
parents, thereby foreclosing the ability of a court to uphold a child custody agreement 
between a parent and non-parent). 
103 See, e.g., Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1444 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding substantial 
harm was equivalent to “parental unfitness, inability to provide a home, and abandonment of 
parental rights, other circumstances that would cause the child to suffer positive and 
substantial harm” (quoting Merritt v. Merritt, 550 So. 2d 882, 889 (La. Ct. App. 1989))).  The 
court, interpreting Louisiana’s child custody statutes, held that the non-biological parent in 
a same-sex relationship was unable to obtain custody, because she was not considered a 
parent under the statute and could not demonstrate a substantial harm to remove the child 
from the biological mother’s custody.  Id. at 1145. 
104 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009) (allowing for a de facto parent 
within the enactment of the UPA); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (limiting a third party to 
seek custody only when there is substantial harm to the child in the custody of the 
biological or adoptive parents); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010) (limiting the 
presumption of paternity only to husbands); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) 
(providing third parties the ability to seek custody over a child). 
105 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1) (West 2005) (taking same-sex couples into 
consideration by including “domestic partnership” within its version of the UPA).  But see 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (omitting the presumption of paternity when a male holds the 
child as his own, found within the current language of the UPA). 
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and child custody statutes.106  The granting of rights to a non-biological 
parent will depend heavily on the judicial interpretation of the legislative 
language.107 
C. Judicial Interpretation of Parenting Statutes 
Based on the language of states’ statutes that define a parent and 
child custody, courts are able to extend equitable remedies like the de 
facto parent doctrine to non-biological parents.108  But like the variation 
among states’ legislatures, courts may or may not be willing to extend 
such doctrines based on the state’s statutory language.109  This difference 
among the courts varies within states enacting the UPA, as well as 
within states choosing not to enact the UPA.110 
1. Judicial Interpretation Within States Enacting the UPA 
Judicial application of the de facto parent doctrine is dependent on 
the particular state’s statutory language.111  Courts rely on the language 
                                                 
106 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2006) (recognizing a de facto parent within 
the statutory definition).  But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (allowing a presumption of 
parentage only for a male married to the mother of a child).  Because courts rely heavily on 
statutes, it is the legislatures that are imperative in combating discrimination against a non-
biological parent in a same-sex couple.  See Miller, supra note 4, at 75, 80 (discussing how 
legislatures must be specific in their parenting laws in order to guide courts correctly in the 
intent behind the laws). 
107 See infra Part II.C (discussing the difference among court interpretations of statutory 
language to allow for, or prohibit, non-biological parents of a same-sex relationship the 
ability to have parental rights over their child). 
108 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (applying the de facto 
parent doctrine, because the court found it was within the legislature’s intent to recognize 
such relationships, and it was within the judicial discretion of the court to apply such for an 
equitable remedy). 
109 See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (failing to apply de facto 
parental status, because the state’s enactment of the UPA “only allows claims for 
declaration of a parent-child relationship based on a biological tie or a presumption due to 
marriage or attempted marriage”); Meyer, supra note 31, at 136 (explaining how courts in 
California and Washington have allowed both a biological and non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship to be legal parents because each held the child out as her own). 
110 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176 (applying the de facto doctrine as a common 
law remedy where the state’s enactment of the UPA left a gap); see also Boseman v. Jarrell, 
704 S.E.2d 494, 504–05 (N.C. 2010) (allowing a non-biological parent the ability to seek 
custody over a child conceived in a same-sex relationship).  But cf. White, 293 S.W.3d at 15 
(reasoning that there was no support for application of the common law doctrine of a de 
facto parent); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (precluding the 
ability of a non-biological parent to seek custody without demonstrating great substantial 
harm to the child). 
111 Miller, supra note 4, at 75.  Some courts have difficulty in determining whether the 
legislature intended to allow equitable doctrines like de facto parent or to strictly interpret 
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and the intent of the legislature to determine if such remedies are 
available.112  Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine, because the UPA 
has not explicitly recognized it as a viable definition of a legal parent.113  
For example, before Delaware adopted de facto parenting within its UPA 
statute, a court denied applying the doctrine to a non-biological parent in 
a same-sex relationship because the General Assembly did not include or 
recognize it.114  It was not until the Delaware UPA codified de facto 
parenting that the Delaware courts extended the doctrine to a non-
biological parent of a same-sex relationship.115 
Even when a state’s legislature does not explicitly recognize de facto 
parenting within the state’s UPA, courts have allowed for a non-
biological parent in a same-sex relationship to assert custodial rights.116  
                                                                                                             
statutes, thereby refusing to allow de facto parent when such doctrines are not codified.  Id.  
In comparison, other courts are willing to find common law remedies like de facto parent, 
despite the legislature’s failure to codify it, because it fills in the gaps the legislature has 
ignored.  Id. 
112 See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14 (Del. 2009) (holding that, because the legislature 
did not explicitly recognize de facto parent, the court did not have the ability to use this 
doctrine); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 75 (discussing a California court decision broadly 
applying the presumption of paternity under the UPA to a non-biological mother in a 
lesbian relationship). 
113 Smith, 968 A.2d. at 15; see also White, 293 S.W.3d at 11, 13 (stating that the state’s UPA 
was to be used to determine parentage and it did not include de facto parenting); Miller, 
supra note 4, at 74 (discussing that a strict interpretation of the UPA often results in a court 
not viewing de facto parents as legal parents). 
114 Smith, 968 A.2d at 14–15.  In Smith, a non-biological mother sought custody over a 
child the lesbian couple raised together.  Id. at 3.  Smith had legally adopted the child while 
the couple was together, but Gordon did not legally adopt the child.  Id.  After the couple 
ended their eleven-year relationship, Gordon sought custody of the child because she 
raised and cared for the child as her own.  Id.  This case took place before the Delaware 
legislature had amended its UPA to include a de facto parent as a legal parent; therefore, 
the court denied Gordon the ability to have custody over the child.  Id. at 15. 
115 Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 932 (Del. 2011).  The Delaware Supreme Court held that 
de facto parenting was statutorily recognized by the legislature; therefore, it must be 
applied when the party meets the requirements.  Id.  Guest, the actual adoptive parent of 
the child in the lesbian relationship, attempted to argue that the application of de facto 
parent violated her due process rights because she was the sole parent.  Id. at 930.  The 
Court distinguished the Delaware de facto parent doctrine from the visitation statute at 
issue in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville.  Id. at 931 (citing Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000)).  In Troxel, the Supreme Court held that a state visitation 
statute violated the due process rights of the natural parent, because it “effectively 
permit[ted] any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent 
concerning visitation of the parent’s children to state-court review.”  Id. at 930 (quoting 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67).  Delaware distinguished the Guest case because the issue before the 
Delaware court was not whether the court infringed on the fundamental rights of a parent; 
rather, the issue was whether Guest was established as a legal parent under the statutory 
framework.  Id. at 931 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60). 
116 See Id. at 13 n.86 (discussing how other courts have applied de facto parenting 
despite the doctrine not being within a state statute).  In deciding not to apply the de facto 
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A Washington court applied the de facto parent doctrine because it was 
“necessary ‘to fill the interstices that [the] current legislative enactment 
fails to cover in a manner consistent with [the] laws and stated legislative 
policy.’”117  Unlike Delaware, the Washington court used the doctrine 
despite it not being legislatively recognized in its UPA enactment.118 
Other courts have not explicitly applied the de facto parent doctrine 
but have still interpreted the state’s UPA as permitting a non-biological 
parent to seek custodial rights over a child.119  In Texas, a court held that 
a non-biological parent had the ability to seek custody over a child of a 
same-sex relationship.120  Although Texas has not defined a de facto 
parent as a legal parent within its UPA, the court interpreted the child 
custody statute as permitting a non-biological parent to seek custody, 
because it allowed a person with “actual care, control, and possession of 
a child” to seek custody over the child.121  As these cases demonstrate, 
courts are able to extend legal rights to non-biological parents in same-
sex relationships based on their interpretation of legislative language 
                                                                                                             
parent doctrine, the Delaware court recognized that other UPA states, like Washington, 
have used de facto parent despite the failure of the legislature to recognize it.  Id. at 13.  
Washington had based its decision to apply de facto parent to a non-biological parent in a 
lesbian relationship by determining the legislature did not preclude it.  Id. at 13–14.  
Regardless of this precedent, Delaware failed to follow this line of reasoning and did not 
extend de facto parenting to the non-biological parent of the same-sex couple because of 
the statutory language of the Delaware UPA.  Id. at 15. 
117 In re Parentage J.M.W., No. 64334-7-I, 2010 WL 4159385, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 
25, 2010) (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 707 (Wash. 2005)). 
118 Id. 
119 See In re M.K.S.-V, 301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a non-
biological mother had standing to seek conservatorship over a child conceived during the 
lesbian relationship through artificial insemination). 
120 Id.  In the case of M.K.S.-V, the couple was together for six years before deciding to 
conceive a child through artificial insemination.  Id. at 462.  Together, they decided to 
parent the child.  Id.  After the couple split, the birth mother and the non-biological mother 
agreed to a visitation schedule.  Id.  They continued to adhere to the schedule for two years 
until the birth mother abruptly discontinued the visits.  Id.  The non-biological mother then 
filed suit to seek custody over the child she had parented for four years.  Id.  The Texas 
legislature has defined conservatorship as “a person . . . who has had actual care, control, 
and possession of [a] child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding 
the date of the filing of the petition [for conservatorship].”  Id. at 464 (quoting TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2008)).  Because of this statute, the court reasoned that the 
non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship has the ability to seek custody over the 
child.  Id. at 465. 
121 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (providing a Texas statute outside of its 
UPA enactment that allows third-party standing for custody by showing the necessary 
elements of conservatorship).  But cf. id. at §§ 160.001 et seq. (2011) (declaring that Texas’s 
enactment of the UPA does not include the de facto parent doctrine); see also In re M.K.S.-V, 
301 S.W.3d at 464 (explaining that the conservatorship statute allows individuals to have 
standing to seek custody over a child). 
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and intent.122  But when legislators narrowly define parenting and child 
custody statutes, courts have less discretion to extend equitable doctrines 
to these types of parents.123 
Most often, when states restrict the language of the UPA, courts will 
not recognize a de facto parent.124  In Missouri, the legislature enacted a 
restrictive version of the UPA, eliminating and narrowing the 
presumption of parentage provisions.125  A court determined the de facto 
parent doctrine was not available because the legislature had intended to 
exclude such when it narrowed the language of its UPA.126  Therefore, 
the court refused to extend equitable remedies to non-biological parents 
in same-sex relationships.127  The judicial ability to extend the de facto 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 932 (Del. 2011) (upholding the legislature’s 
enactment of de facto parent doctrine within its UPA as constitutional); In re Parentage of 
L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (holding that the de facto parent doctrine was an equitable remedy to 
grant a non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship custody over the child). 
123 See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that de facto 
parenting could not be used because the legislature enacted the UPA with strict 
requirements of parentage). 
124 See Miller, supra note 75, at 1388–89 (discussing Missouri’s unwillingness to apply the 
de facto parent doctrine to same-sex couples); see also White, 293 S.W.3d at 10 (discussing 
Missouri’s enactment of the UPA that amended language from the current version of the 
UPA); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007) (enacting the UPA with marital 
language, and thereby the courts have rejected de facto parent because it was not within 
the UPA).  Non-biological parents in these states have attempted to assert in loco parentis.  
See, e.g., Jones, 154 P.3d at 811–12 (discussing a non-biological parent who sought standing 
to seek custody under the loco parentis doctrine, which was denied).  “[I]n loco parentis is 
applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent 
in a child’s life” but is only able to assert visitation rights rather than custodial rights.  Id. at 
811.  Ultimately, it is a failing argument for gay and lesbian non-biological parents, because 
courts have held the end of the romantic relationship will terminate the parent-like child 
relationship the biological parent gave to the non-biological parent.  Id. at 815. 
125 MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (West 2010); see also supra note 74 (discussing Missouri’s 
and Utah’s amendments of the UPA). 
126 See White, 293 S.W.3d at 11 (“MoUPA only allows claims for declaration of a parent-
child relationship based on a biological tie or a presumption due to marriage . . . .”); Miller, 
supra note 75, at 1395 (discussing that under Missouri’s enactment of the UPA, a non-
biological mother could not establish standing to seek custody). 
127 White, 293 S.W.3d at 15.  In White, Leslea and Elizabeth had been together for eight 
years.  Id. at 6.  Each woman gave birth to a child conceived through artificial reproduction, 
and the two children were raised by both women.  Id.  After the couple separated, Leslea 
petitioned the court to declare that each woman was a co-parent of the two children.  Id.  
However, Missouri’s UPA did not allow third parties to seek custody or visitation rights 
over a child, essentially prohibiting a non-biological parent of a child conceived during a 
lesbian partnership from seeking custody over the child.  Id. at 11.  Like Missouri, Utah 
adopted a restrictive version of the UPA, including marital terms within provisions where 
the UPA did not, as well as eliminating certain presumption of paternity provisions.  See 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-204, 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (eliminating the presumption of 
paternity when a male holds a child out as his own and restricting the artificial 
insemination provision to husbands).  As a result, some courts have refused to apply de 
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parent doctrine to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship 
depends on the state’s enactment of the UPA.128  Similarly, non-UPA 
states will also differ in judicial application of the de facto parent 
doctrine on the basis of statutory language.129 
2. Judicial Interpretation Within States Not Enacting the UPA 
Similar to states enacting the UPA, judicial interpretation of statutes 
not enacting the UPA will vary based on the expansive or restrictive 
definition of a parent.130  Aside from recognizing the de facto parent 
doctrine, states have granted a non-biological parent legal rights over a 
child through other avenues.131  For example, North Carolina child 
                                                                                                             
facto parenting because it would “exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary.”  Jones, 154 
P.3d at 816. 
128 See In re M.K.S.-V, 301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing a non-biological 
parent the ability to seek custody).  But see White, 293 S.W.3d at 6 (prohibiting a non-
biological parent the ability to seek custody over a child conceived during her relationship). 
129 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the difference in court interpretations of non-UPA state 
statutes in considering whether the court could apply psychological parenting doctrines to 
a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship). 
130 See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010) (holding second parent 
adoption was not permitted for same-sex couples, but a non-biological parent was granted 
joint custody over the child because the biological mother had lost her paramount 
parenting right by consenting with the non-biological mother to co-parent the child).  But 
see Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to allow a non-
biological parent custody over a child conceived through artificial insemination during the 
lesbian relationship because a natural parent’s paramount right was unable to be disturbed 
absent unusual circumstances).  In Boseman, the partners agreed to jointly parent a child 
conceived through artificial insemination during their romantic relationship.  Boseman, 704 
S.E.2d at 497.  The non-biological mother participated in the pregnancy and birth of their 
child by various actions, including attending doctor appointments and reading to their 
child in the womb.  Id.  The non-biological parent was an active parent throughout the 
child’s life.  Id.  After approximately six years of raising the child together, the couple 
decided to split.  Id. at 498.  The non-biological parent continued to provide financial 
support for the child after the split.  Id.  The court granted joint custody to each parent.  Id. 
at 494.  On the contrary, a Louisiana court refused to grant joint custody despite the non-
biological parent acting as a parent.  Black, 12 So. 3d at 1145.  A lesbian couple had a child 
together using artificial insemination.  Id. at 1141.  At first, the biological mother permitted 
weekend visits with the non-biological parent but then disallowed such visits; therefore, 
the non-biological parent sought custody.  Id.  Ultimately, the court held that the removal 
of the non-biological parent from the child’s life did not meet the substantial harm 
threshold required by statute, and it subsequently denied the non-biological mother 
custodial rights.  Id. at 1145.  
131 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing an individual to be determined a de 
facto custodian and given equal standing for custody of a child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (“Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or 
institution claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or 
proceeding for the custody of such child . . . .”).  A North Carolina statute allows for a court 
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custody statutes allow third parties to seek custody over a child when a 
parent-child like relationship has been established.132  Therefore, courts 
are able to grant custodial rights to a non-biological parent.133 
In some instances, courts have granted custodial rights to a non-
biological parent in a same-sex relationship when the court finds that the 
natural parent has waived or relinquished his or her superior right as a 
parent.134  For example, Kentucky has recognized that a non-biological 
parent in a same-sex relationship had a legal right over the couple’s 
child, because the biological mother waived her superior parenting right 
when she brought the third party into the household and held her out to 
be a parent.135  By the biological mother bringing in the third party to act 
as a parent, the court reasoned that the biological mother intended to 
waive her superior rights over the child, which entitled the non-
biological parent to legal rights.136  Although courts in North Carolina 
and Kentucky have permitted a non-biological parent to seek custody, 
this is heavily dependent on the interpretation of the respective statutory 
                                                                                                             
to grant custody and visitation to third parties, as long as it is in the best interest of the 
child. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2. 
132 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a); see also Smith v. Barbour, 571 S.E.2d 872, 877–78 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the statute does not leave unlimited ability for any person 
to establish custody over a child, but it is more narrowly applied to third parties who can 
establish a parent-child like relationship). 
133 See Ellison v. Ramos, 502 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (providing a non-
biological parent standing after illustrating and establishing a parent-child like 
relationship); see also Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 504–05 (reasoning that the biological mother 
acted “inconsistently with her paramount parental status” by sharing parental 
responsibilities with the third party, which allowed the third party (the non-biological 
mother) to establish a claim for joint custody). 
134 See Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 503.  Regardless of the unavailability of second parent 
adoption, the court reasoned that a third party is able to assert rights to custody when the 
natural parent has “acted inconsistent with her paramount parental rights.”  Id. at 502.  
Furthermore, the act of bringing a third party, who acts as a parent to the child, into the 
family unit is evidence of a natural parent acting inconsistent with such paramount right, 
which allows a third party standing for custody.  Id. at 504–05. 
135 Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010).  In Mullins, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court followed a similar line of reasoning as North Carolina when determining 
custody of a child conceived through artificial insemination during a lesbian relationship.  
Id.  It reasoned a third party may establish a right to custody by showing:  “(1) that the 
parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit custodian, or (2) that the 
parent has waived his or her superior right to custody by clear and convincing evidence.”  
Id. at 578 (footnote omitted).  Similar to North Carolina, waiver was explained to be a 
parent’s “intentional surrender or relinquishment” of his or her superior right to the child 
by allowing a third party acting as a parent into the home.  Id. at 578. 
136 Id. at 579; see also Boseman 704 S.E.2d at 503 (“[W]hen a parent brings a nonparent into 
the family unit, represents that the nonparent is a parent, and voluntarily gives custody of 
the child to the nonparent without creating an expectation that the relationship would be 
terminated, the parent has acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status.”). 
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language.137  Therefore, those states that have restrictive language are 
more likely to deny such rights to a non-biological parent.138 
Judicial interpretation in states not enacting the UPA may result in 
the denial of parental rights to a non-biological parent in a same-sex 
relationship.139  These courts deny legal rights by adhering to a 
paramount parental right of biological parents.140  These courts 
determine the biological parent has a paramount parental right that a 
third party cannot disturb without showing a “substantial harm” to the 
child.141  Courts in Louisiana have used this approach to deny a non-
biological parent of a same-sex couple legal parental rights, because 
granting sole custody to the biological parent did not create a substantial 
harm to the child.142  Because of these narrowed child custody statutes, 
joint custody between a natural and non-biological parent is not allowed, 
because it would infringe on the paramount rights of the natural 
parent.143  Therefore, courts often refuse to apply any equitable remedies 
the legislature has not explicitly provided.144 
                                                 
137 See Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 895 (interpreting the state’s third-party custody statute as 
allowing those who have established a parent-child like relationship to seek custody).  But 
see Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (limiting third-party standing 
for custodial suits based on the restrictive nature of the child custody statutes). 
138 See, e.g., Black, 12 So. 3d. at 1145 (denying a non-biological parent custodial rights 
because such rights are given solely to biological parents unless there is substantial harm). 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 1143.  The court in Black stated a heightened standard is required to establish a 
third party’s right to custody and is limited only to situations in which there would be 
substantial harm to a child by remaining with the natural parent.  Id.  The non-biological 
parent argued that substantial harm would occur by severing the relationship between the 
third party and child.  Id. at 1143–44.  But the court reasoned that only in rare situations of 
abuse or neglect would a third party have standing to interfere with the natural parent’s 
rights.  Id. at 1144. 
141 Id. at 1143 (“[T]he paramount right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his 
or [her] child, the legislature has provided that an award of custody to a non-parent as 
opposed to a parent can only occur in rare circumstances.”)  Further, based on the language 
of the statues, the court reasoned an award of custody to a non-biological parent “first 
requires a finding that an award of sole custody to the parent would cause substantial 
harm.”  Id.  Therefore, the Louisiana court refused to allow joint custody to a non-biological 
parent based on this idea of paramount parental right.  Id. at 1145. 
142 Id. at 1145. 
143 Id.  The idea behind the paramount right of a natural parent has been affirmed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, which held “that parents have a fundamental 
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children.”  Meyer, supra note 31, at 141.  
Because of such, some states have reasoned parental rights are unable to be extended to 
non-biological parents.  Id.  But this holding in Troxel did not explicitly restrict the parental 
rights of non-biological parents.  Id. at 142.  Rather, the decision was a narrow holding for 
the given facts and left flexibility for future decisions on parental rights.  Id.  Those who 
wish to uphold a traditional family—a mother and father—advance arguments against 
gays and lesbians as parents.  See generally Alysse ElHage, Why Gender Matters to Parenting:  
All Families Are Not Created Equal, N.C. FAM. POL’Y COUNCIL, 
Sroka: A Mother Yesterday, but Not Today:  Deficiencies of the Uniform P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
562 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Overall, it is clear that states have inconsistent approaches in 
determining the legal parental status of a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship.145  The language of a state statute that defines a 
parent and child custody determines whether a non-biological parent 
can obtain rights over a child conceived during the same-sex 
relationship.146  As a result, Part III of this Note scrutinizes the legislative 
language that gives rise to the judicial interpretation to grant or deny 
parenting rights in a same-sex couple.147 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Legal recognition as a parent grants many rights and benefits to both 
the parent and the child.148  Marriage is a simple way to establish legal 
parental status over a child that is conceived during a marriage.149  
Unfortunately, many states do not legally recognize same-sex marriage; 
therefore, a non-biological parent may not be considered a legal 
parent.150  In addition, because second parent adoption is not available in 
many states, a non-biological parent cannot jointly adopt a child 
conceived through artificial insemination or adopted during the 
                                                                                                             
www.ncfamily.org/FNC/1104S1-GenderMatters.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (arguing a 
child suffers when they are not raised by a father and a mother).  Despite these arguments, 
studies have shown that homosexual parents are no different than heterosexual parents.  
See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and Lesbian 
Parents § 3 (2001) (asserting that the numerous studies comparing homosexual parents to 
heterosexual parents have shown there is no difference to preclude same-sex couples from 
parenting).  See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Six Myths that Confuse the Marriage 
Equality Debate, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 103 (2011) (providing six myths about homosexual 
marriage that are factually unfounded).  
144 See Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143 (refusing to extend custody to a non-biological parent 
based on the state statutes). 
145 See Miller, supra note 4, at 74 (discussing the various approaches taken by courts in 
determining parental status). 
146 See supra note 130 (comparing the interpretation of North Carolina’s broad custody 
statute, which allows non-biological parents in same-sex relationships to seek custody of a 
child, with Louisiana’s restrictive statutory language, which only allows legal parental 
rights to a non-biological parent in rare circumstances). 
147 See infra Part III (examining the benefits and limitations in the approaches taken by 
states in determining whether to grant legal parental status to same-sex couples). 
148 See supra note 23 (discussing the importance of establishing a legal parent-child 
relationship). 
149 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when a child is born within a marriage). 
150 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (surveying the legal recognition of same-
sex marriage and discussing the availability of second parent adoption for same-sex 
parents). 
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relationship.151  As a result, non-biological parents lose their child if the 
partnership ends.152  As the UPA is an influential model for states 
creating parenting statutes, it is necessary to analyze its effect on parents 
and children within same-sex relationships.153 
This Part analyzes the UPA in its current form.154  First, it examines 
the UPA’s benefits as a whole and as it is applied to same-sex couples.155  
Next, it details the numerous limitations of the UPA that result in its 
inapplicability to same-sex couples, depriving them of legal parental 
status.156  Further, this Note compares the UPA against the parenting 
statutes of non-UPA states, illustrating how the UPA fails to protect 
parents and children of same-sex couples.157  As this analysis shows, it is 
necessary for state legislatures to enact effective statutes that expansively 
define parentage and child custody to ensure a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship—who has been a parent in every other possible 
way—continues to be legally recognized as a parent if the couple’s 
relationship ends.158 
A. The Benefits and Limitations of the UPA on Same-Sex Couples 
Although the UPA is not binding on any state, it is an influential 
model and one that many states have enacted in its entirety.159  Because 
of the UPA’s intended purpose of protecting children born out of 
marriage, the UPA has certain beneficial aspects, even for same-sex 
                                                 
151 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of second parent 
adoption and its availability for same-sex couples to establish legal parental status within 
the United States). 
152 See, e.g., In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308–09 (Ohio 2011) (denying a non-biological 
parent custody rights after the same-sex relationship ended). 
153 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining how the UPA is a model statue to 
guide states in creating uniform laws on the definition of parentage); see also infra Part III.A 
(analyzing the UPA’s application to parents within same-sex relationships). 
154 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the impact of the UPA on a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship by showing its benefits and limitations). 
155 See infra Part III.A.1 (examining the benefits of the UPA by looking at its intent and 
purpose). 
156 See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the current language of the UPA cannot be 
applied to same-sex couples, thereby resulting in parents and children losing legal rights). 
157 Compare infra Part III.A (scrutinizing the states that have enacted the UPA), with infra 
Part III.B (examining the statutes in effect in non-UPA states to illustrate the disadvantages 
of the UPA for same-sex couples). 
158 See infra Part IV (contributing amendments to the language of the UPA to correct its 
deficiencies in regards to non-biological parents of same-sex relationships). 
159 See supra Part II.A (explaining the UPA and the provisions that are instrumental in 
determining parentage); supra note 24 (discussing the states that have enacted the UPA).  
Even when states enact the UPA, they may choose to alter its language.  See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.101 et seq. (West 2005) (enacting the UPA but including gender-
neutral language and the term domestic partnership within marriage presumptions). 
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couples.160  However, at the same time, the language of the UPA 
negatively affects same-sex couples seeking legal parental status and is 
overall ineffective in protecting the non-biological parent of a same-sex 
couple.161 
1. Benefits of States Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex Couples 
As the UPA stands, it has minimal benefits for same-sex couples, 
which arise only when the intent of the UPA’s provisions are broadly 
interpreted.162  One positive aspect of the UPA is that it determines 
parentage without the consideration of marital status.163  Because the 
intent of the UPA was to create equality among children born in and out 
of marriage, states, in theory, are able to promote this intent and extend 
the UPA to children of same-sex couples, despite these couples being 
unable to marry.164  Even in states that do not recognize same-sex 
marriage, same-sex couples would not be precluded from establishing 
parenthood on the basis of the inability to marry, because the intent of 
the UPA can apply despite gender-specific language, thereby benefiting 
same-sex couples.165  Although some may argue that the UPA was not 
enacted to extend rights to individuals in same-sex relationships, the 
UPA inadvertently extends its coverage to parents in same-sex 
relationships because of this intent to treat children born in and out of 
marriage equally.166 
                                                 
160 See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the benefits of the UPA). 
161 See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining the deficiencies of the current UPA, because it fails to 
recognize and protect all types of parents). 
162 See supra note 64 (explaining how Washington has enacted the UPA but changed its 
language, thereby allowing the provisions to apply to same-sex couples). 
163 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that the UPA was created in response 
to the Supreme Court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to treat 
children born in and out of wedlock equally). 
164 See MOULDING, supra note 30, at 102–03 (discussing how a California court applied the 
UPA presumption of paternity provision, which grants paternity when holding a child out 
as one’s own, to a non-biological mother of a same-sex relationship based on the intent of 
the provision). 
165 Id.  Although California does not recognize same-sex marriage, it ignored the gender-
specific language and used its enactment of UPA section 204(a)(4) presumption of paternity 
to deny custody rights to a lesbian couple because of the intent of the provision.  Id. 
166 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (explaining that the UPA was intended 
to create uniformity among children born in and outside of marriage; therefore, in applying 
the UPA’s overarching purpose, marital status should not be a factor in determining legal 
parental status).  The UPA was created to promote equality among children who were born 
in and out of wedlock.  Kramer, supra note 24, at 645.  The UPA intended to create a model 
statute for states in order to equalize legal rights and erase discrimination that occurred 
based on parental, marital status.  Id.  Arguably, this purpose should extend to children of 
same-sex relationships in order to promote equality among children.  Id. 
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Moreover, the UPA provides for several instances of presumed 
parentage that are beneficial to non-biological parents in a same-sex 
relationship, because these provisions do not require a biological link.167  
For example, the UPA recognizes a presumption of parentage that is 
analogous to a de facto parent.168  Because section 204 of the UPA defines 
a legal parent as one who essentially acts like a parent, courts reasonably 
interpret the UPA to permit the application of equitable remedies like the 
de facto parent doctrine, which further broaden the application to same-
sex couples.169  Regardless of the gender-specific language, this 
presumption of parental status can be extended to any non-biological 
parent in a same-sex relationship, because the purpose of the provision is 
to grant legal parental status when an individual acts like a parent.170  
Because the UPA recognizes a presumption of parental status similar to a 
de facto parent, a state can interpret this as intent to create a 
presumption in a mother-child relationship for a non-biological parent in 
a lesbian relationship.171  Even when courts strictly adhere to the gender-
specific terms of this provision, it still protects a non-biological father in 
a same-sex relationship, because he is able to establish himself as a father 
by holding the child out as his own without showing a biological link.172  
As a result, section 204 can protect non-biological parents when courts 
look at its purpose without considering gender.173 
                                                 
167 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  These two 
provisions of the UPA allow for fatherhood to be established without proving a biological 
link.  Id.  For example, section 204 allows a male to be a legal father if he was married to the 
woman who gave birth to the child during the marriage.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) 
§ 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).  It also allows for a presumption of 
paternity when a male holds a child out to the world as his own.   UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012). 
168 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).  
This provision provides that a male is a presumed father when “for the first two years of 
the child’s life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the 
child as his own.”  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 
(Supp. 2012). 
169 See Miller, supra note 4, at 75 (discussing how a California court applied this UPA 
provision, despite the gender terms, deeming the non-biological mother in a lesbian 
relationship as a legal parent). 
170 Id. 
171 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012).  
Although the UPA does not explicitly mention de facto parent, the presumption for 
paternity is analogous to the definition of de facto parent, therefore essentially allowing a 
father to be established as a de facto parent.  Id. 
172 Id.  Because the provision does not require the presumption of paternity in the context 
of a heterosexual relationship, it could be applied to a non-biological male parent 
attempting to establish himself as a legal parent over a child.  Id. 
173 Id. 
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Further benefiting same-sex couples, section 703 of the UPA allows a 
presumption of a parent-child relationship when one partner conceives a 
child through artificial insemination.174  By looking at the purpose of this 
provision, courts can extend this presumption to same-sex couples who 
use such procedures to conceive a child.175  The UPA allows for 
parentage without a biological link because the father intended to be the 
child’s parent.176  Thus, this presumption can be broadly extended to 
same-sex couples in which the non-biological parent consents to the 
procedures and intends to be the parent of the child.177  Even if courts 
refuse to apply the provision to a female in a same-sex relationship 
because of the gender-specific language of the provision, it will apply to 
the non-biological father and biological father of a same-sex relationship 
                                                 
174 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  This 
provision states that “[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her 
child, is a parent of the resulting child.”  Id. 
175 See Polikoff, supra note 25, at 222 (discussing how a court in New Jersey applied the 
presumption of paternity, in a case involving artificial insemination, to a lesbian couple 
despite the marital language of husband and wife). 
176 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012); see also 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.26.710 (West 2005) (enacting a similar provision to section 703 
of the UPA but using gender-neutral terms, and, therefore, it is applicable to lesbian 
couples who use artificial insemination and creates a presumption of parentage for the 
non-biological parent).  By extending this presumption of parentage to include same-sex 
couples, a non-biological parent in a lesbian relationship is able to establish legal parentage 
over a child conceived through artificial reproduction during the relationship.  Id. 
177 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710 (allowing a provision similar to section 
703 of the UPA to be applied to both genders, thereby enabling presumption of parentage 
provisions to be applicable to same-sex couples).  The provision allows for a male to be 
presumed the father when he consents to assisted reproduction by a woman and intends to 
parent the child.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 
2012).  The comment to the provision demonstrates that this provision “reflects the concern 
for the best interests of nonmarital” children of assisted reproduction.  UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT (2000) § 703 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  Because the provision 
can be applied without consideration of gender, it will apply to same-sex couples to 
presume parentage for the non-biological parent.  See MOULDING, supra note 30, at 102–03 
(explaining how a California court broadly applied the UPA presumption provision to 
grant legal parental status to a non-biological mother because of the intent); Polikoff, supra 
note 25, at 222–23 (discussing the New Jersey court that applied the New Jersey 
insemination statute without consideration of gender). 
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who commission a surrogate.178  As a result, this provision of the UPA is 
greatly advantageous for male parents in same-sex relationships.179 
Unfortunately, the benefits of the UPA for parents in a same-sex 
relationship are limited.180  In its current form, the UPA can only protect 
parents of a same-sex couple if courts look solely to the intent of the 
provisions and apply them without regard to gender.181  The gender-
specific language of the UPA creates greater limitations than benefits to 
parents in a same-sex relationship, and non-biological male fathers are 
more protected than similarly situated females.182 
2. Limitations of the UPA to Same-Sex Couples 
Overall, the UPA hinders same-sex couples from establishing legal 
parental status.183  The UPA is inapplicable to parents of same-sex 
couples for three major reasons:  (1) it uses gender-specific language; (2) 
it does not explicitly recognize the de facto parent doctrine; and (3) it 
allows for a presumption of parentage within the context of marriage.184  
First, the language of the UPA’s presumption of parentage provision is 
deceptive because it only allows for a presumption of paternity, not 
parentage.185  Although these provisions are applicable to a male non-
                                                 
178 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  The 
language states that “[a] man who . . . consents to[] assisted reproduction by a 
woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”  
Id.  Arguably, if one male donates the sperm to be used by a surrogate, the male partner, 
who is a non-biological parent, can be established as a father through this presumption 
provision because he consents to the surrogate and intends to be the father.  Id. 
179 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of paternity 
statutes available to establish a legal father relationship that are unavailable for mothers, 
therefore, giving non-biological male parents in a same-sex relationship more avenues to 
establish legal parental status because of their gender). 
180 See infra Part III.A.2 (illustrating that the limitations of the UPA as applied to same-sex 
couples are greater than the benefits). 
181 Compare supra note 175 (showing how a court applied the presumption of paternity for 
heterosexual couples using artificial insemination, regardless of gender; therefore, it 
applied to a lesbian couple as well), with supra note 126 (discussing how a Missouri court 
strictly adhered to the gender specific language of the presumption provisions and refused 
to apply similar presumptions to a same-sex couple). 
182 See infra Part III.A.2 (scrutinizing the language of the UPA in its current form to 
demonstrate the UPA is deficient because it cannot apply to same-sex couples). 
183 See supra note 32 (discussing how the UPA was not created in consideration of gay 
and lesbians parents, despite the opportunity to make changes in its latest 2002 
amendment). 
184 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 101 et seq. (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 299–376 
(2001) (reading the UPA in its entirety, there is no provision explicitly recognizing the de 
facto parent doctrine). 
185 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (permitting a 
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biological parent in a same-sex relationship, it limits the legal parental 
status of female non-biological parents.186  When the language is strictly 
enforced, it forecloses the ability of a female non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship to assert parental status under the provisions.187  
Therefore, the gender-specific language of section 703 of the UPA 
unfairly makes it inapplicable to a lesbian couple who uses artificial 
insemination to conceive a child.188 
Furthermore, although the UPA allows for a presumption of 
paternity similar to a de facto parent, this provision fails to protect same-
sex couples because it does not explicitly recognize a de facto parent, and 
it limits this presumption solely to males.189  As a result of the UPA’s 
failure to clearly provide for de facto parental status, states may refuse to 
permit the doctrine, reasoning that the legislature did not provide for 
such a remedy.190  Therefore, the UPA unjustly limits the application of 
the de facto parent doctrine despite it providing presumptive parenting 
provisions.191  When courts do allow for this presumption, its language 
will only be applicable to a male non-biological parent.192  Thus, these 
                                                                                                             
presumption of paternity in certain circumstances, including marriage and consent in 
artificial reproduction cases). 
186 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).  
Because the language specifically states that “[a] man who . . . consents to[] assisted 
reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent,” a court strictly adhering to 
the language will be unable to apply this to a female non-biological parent.  Id.  See White v. 
White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (reasoning Missouri’s UPA could not apply to 
a non-biological female in a same-sex relationship because the paternity presumptions did 
not apply to a female). 
187 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). 
188 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (explaining how UPA provisions for the 
presumption of paternity are applied solely to males; therefore, these UPA provisions are 
not available to establish a mother-child relationship). 
189 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 
2012) (recognizing paternity when a male holds the child out as his own, but the Act does 
not explicitly define de facto parent as a legal parent), with ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, 
§ 2.03(1)(c), at 18 (recognizing a de facto parent when the parent shows that he or she is the 
primary caregiver for a period no less than two years). 
190 See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply the de facto 
parent doctrine because the legislature did not explicitly recognize it within its UPA 
enactment); White, 293 S.W.3d at 15 (refusing to apply the de facto parent doctrine that was 
used in other states like Wisconsin). 
191 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing how the UPA failed to recognize 
the de facto parent doctrine recommendations); see also Smith, 968 A.2d at 14 (refusing to 
recognize the de facto parent doctrine because the legislature did not recognize it in its 
enactment of the UPA). 
192 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 
2012) (providing language permitting only a presumption of paternity). 
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presumption provisions of the UPA unfairly discriminate against female 
non-biological parents in same-sex relationships.193 
Further restricting its application to same-sex relationships, the UPA 
does not include terms applicable to same-sex relationships, like 
domestic partnerships.194  Even a gender-neutral interpretation of section 
204, which presumes paternity when a child is conceived within 
marriage, cannot be applied to same-sex couples.195  Same-sex marriage 
is not legalized in many states; therefore, a court cannot interpret the 
provision broadly and apply it to a same-sex couple regardless of 
gender.196  As a result, the UPA neglects to consider same-sex couples in 
the determination of parentage, because the presumption of parentage 
provisions cannot be applied to same-sex couples based on the gender 
and marital requirements.197 
Although the UPA was intended to equalize the status of children, it 
contradicts this purpose by treating children and the non-biological 
parent of a same-sex relationship differently than those in a heterosexual 
relationship.198  This restricts the ability of a non-biological parent in a 
same-sex relationship to establish a legal parent-child relationship, 
which is necessary to ascertain custodial rights.199  In recognizing the 
                                                 
193 Id. 
194 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when a child is born within a legally 
recognized marriage), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (West 2005) (amending the 
UPA with the addition of domestic partnership in UPA’s section 201(a)(1), thereby 
allowing a presumption of parentage over a child conceived during a same-sex 
relationship). 
195 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012). 
196 Id. 
197 See id. (establishing a father-child relationship, regardless of a biological link, when 
the male is married to the women and the child is born within that marriage). 
198 See supra notes 31–32 (discussing how the Commissioners did not consider same-sex 
couples in creating the UPA or its subsequent amendments).  Although the UPA does not 
consider same-sex couples, studies have shown that children raised in same-sex 
relationships are well adjusted and just as equipped as children raised in heterosexual 
households.  64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and 
Lesbian Parents § 3 (2001). 
199 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 
2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) 
(limiting the ability of same-sex couples to establish parentage through a presumption, 
because the language of these UPA provisions only apply to heterosexual couples), with 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.116, 26.26.710 (adopting an amended version of the UPA 
to include domestic partnerships and gender neutral language).  Washington’s enactment 
of the UPA with liberal language demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the UPA, because 
Washington’s version can be applied to same-sex couples, whereas the UPA, in its current 
form, is unavailable to same-sex couples.  Id.; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). 
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UPA’s limitations, some states have chosen to amend the deficiencies of 
the UPA and extend its application to same-sex couples.200  But without 
such state amendments, the UPA fails to grant a non-biological parent of 
a same-sex couple legal parental status.201  The UPA does not fully 
protect the legal rights of same-sex parents, but failing to enact the UPA 
does not always result in greater access to legal rights for same-sex 
couples.202 
B. The Benefits and Limitations of Not Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex 
Couples 
Despite the inequities of the UPA, a state’s decision to create its own 
parenting statutes, rather than enact the UPA, does not guarantee greater 
legal rights for non-biological parents in a same-sex relationship.203  
Whether a state has enacted the UPA or chosen not to, the determinative 
factor in granting legal parental status to a non-biological parent is the 
expansive or restrictive language of the statutes.204  Although there are 
benefits to states creating their own parenting statutes, states are still 
able to restrict parental status, thereby denying parents and children 
legal rights they rightfully deserve.205 
1. Benefits of Not Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex Couples 
The decision of a state not to enact the UPA can be beneficial for a 
non-biological parent in a same-sex couple.206  The greatest benefit is that 
these states are not limited by the UPA’s gender-specific and restrictive 
language; therefore, states can expansively define a parent and be 
                                                 
200 See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text (discussing how Washington has 
amended its version of the UPA to be gender neutral, as well as include language such as 
domestic partnerships, thereby allowing provisions to apply to same-sex parents). 
201 Compare supra notes 57–63 (discussing Washington’s liberal enactment of the UPA to 
include gender neutral language, which results in it being applicable to same-sex couples), 
with supra notes 75–76 (discussing how states have enacted the UPA to include marital 
terms, resulting in provisions being inapplicable to same-sex couples). 
202 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the language of state parenting statutes that did not 
enact the UPA and its subsequent effect on same-sex parents). 
203 See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the limitations of non-UPA parental statutes, which 
hinder non-biological parents attempting to seek custody). 
204 See supra Part III.A.1; infra Part III.B.1 (showing that the benefit of state statutes for 
non-biological parents is dependent on whether the state expansively defines parent). 
205 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the limitations of narrow state statutes that restrict 
same-sex couples from establishing themselves as legal parents). 
206 See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing how states like Kentucky 
and North Carolina have enacted liberal statutes that allow third parties to seek custody 
over a child). 
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inclusive in the granting of custody.207  These statutes are comparably 
better than the UPA, because the statutes rectify legal inequalities that 
exist for non-traditional families within the UPA.208  For example, one 
way states correct deficiencies in the UPA is by recognizing (or 
codifying) a de facto parent as a legal parent, whereas the UPA does not 
recognize the de facto parent doctrine.209  As a result, a non-biological 
parent who has raised and supported a child for a given amount of years 
can continue to be a parent rather than “sever[ing] a parent-child 
relationship between [the child] and the person she knows to be her 
mother.”210  As a result of this progressive thinking by legislatures in 
codifying the de facto parent doctrine, it is better for parents in a same-
sex couple to be within a non-UPA jurisdiction.211 
Another benefit for same-sex couples within non-UPA jurisdictions 
is the embracing nature of the child custody statutes often recognized 
within these states.212  Despite the fact that a state may not provide for a 
de facto parent within its definition of a legal parent, states have 
permitted a third party to ascertain claims for custody despite not having 
a biological connection.213  By enabling a third party who has established 
a parent-child-like relationship with the child to gain legal custody over 
                                                 
207 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing de facto custodian status to an 
individual who was not biologically linked to a child to gain legal parental status); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (permitting third parties to sue for custody of a 
child when in the best interests of a child). 
208 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (explicitly recognizing de facto custodian), with 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (West 2010) (failing to recognize de facto parent as a result of the 
UPA’s current language). 
209 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270.  Although Delaware has enacted the de facto parent 
doctrine within its UPA, other states have not; therefore, as a whole, UPA states have not 
codified the doctrine, whereas other states, such as Indiana and Kentucky, have.  See supra 
notes 90–91 (discussing the enactment of the de facto parent doctrine within parenting 
statues). 
210 See In the Matter of L.K.M., LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/ 
cases/in-the-matter-of-lkm (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (discussing the consequences of a 
recent Ohio decision in which the state supreme court denied a non-biological mother 
parenting rights over a child, thereby severing the mother-child relationship the child had 
relied upon). 
211 Compare Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 503–05 (N.C. 2010) (allowing a non-
biological parent custody over a child of a same-sex relationship, because the liberal non-
UPA statute allowed joint custody between a biological mother and a non-biological parent 
when a parent-child like relationship was created), with White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 1 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (denying a non-biological parent custody over a child raised in a 
lesbian relationship and refusing to apply any equitable doctrines, because the UPA did 
not establish her as a legal parent). 
212 See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing states that have not enacted 
the UPA and their liberal construction of child custody statutes). 
213 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (providing North Carolina as an 
example of a state that has enacted statutes allowing a third party to seek custody). 
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the child, these states’ legislatures and courts have endorsed a de facto-
like parent, which will provide the non-biological parent of a same-sex 
couple legal rights over the child, ensuring that the relationship is not 
severed.214  Accordingly, these states are able to extend parent and child 
custody statutes to a non-biological parent in same-sex couples, whereas 
a narrow interpretation of the UPA cannot apply to these types of 
parents.215  As a result, a non-biological parent in a same-sex couple is 
able to gain legal rights over their child, ameliorating both the parent 
and child.216 
Another benefit of states enacting broad custodial provisions is that 
the judicial decisions interpreting the statutes are also broad and 
inclusive of same-sex couples.217  Therefore, even if an individual cannot 
meet all required elements for a de facto parent, courts of these states 
interpret the statutes to include a waiver of natural parenting rights.218  
This waiver doctrine is beneficially equivalent to the de facto parent 
doctrine, because courts apply it in situations when a biological parent 
has intended and consented to a third party who assists in the parenting 
of a child, like a de facto parent.219  Because a state codification of the de 
facto parent doctrine may require the de facto parent to be the sole 
caregiver, this application of waiver, as a result of broad custodial 
statutes, allows non-biological parents another avenue to pursue legal 
                                                 
214 See, e.g., Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 504–05 (affirming a decision for joint custody between 
the biological mother and non-biological mother).  North Carolina has not enacted the 
UPA, but its state statute allows third parties to seek custody once a parent-child 
relationship has been established.  Id.  This is contrary to many UPA states, which have 
held that the UPA enactment within their state prohibited the use of the de facto parenting 
doctrine.  Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007). 
215 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012) 
(limiting the ways in which an individual can be established as a parent), with supra notes 
91–94 (explaining that non-UPA states have been inclusive in their statutory framework in 
defining and granting custody). 
216 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (providing for de facto custodian third 
parties); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to seek 
custody). 
217 See supra notes 133–37 (discussing judicial interpretations that have construed 
custodial statutes broadly). 
218 See supra notes 134–37 (discussing cases in which the court found a waiver of 
paramount parenting status when a natural parent intentionally brought a third party in 
the home to co-parent). 
219 See id. (explaining case law that recognized a non-biological parent’s right to custody 
on the rationale that the biological mother waived superior parenting rights when she 
brought in a lesbian partner who was an active mother, and, as a result, the biological 
mother created a psychological parent). 
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rights over their child.220  Therefore, when non-UPA states expand their 
definition of parent and custody in consideration of non-traditional 
families, judiciaries have a greater ability to grant legal rights to parents 
in same-sex relationships compared to heterosexual parents and the 
restrictive language of the UPA.221 
As evidenced above, states that have not enacted the UPA are 
comparably better in providing legal rights to same-sex parents.222  But 
because state statutes vary to a great degree, the law is convoluted 
among states without the UPA, which consequently restricts the ability 
of non-biological parents in same-sex relationships to establish 
themselves as a legal parent.223  
2. Limitations of Not Enacting the UPA on Same-Sex Couples 
In greatly limiting same-sex parents’ rights, states have narrowly 
defined the word “parent” comparably similar to the UPA.224  Contrary 
to the UPA’s purpose, these non-UPA states often use marriage as a 
means to define parentage.225  Such states are restrictive in their 
definition of a parent, even going so far as to limit it to a biological or 
adoptive link.226  Because these states do not recognize a presumption of 
parentage outside of marriage, their statutes prohibit a court from 
extending equitable relief, such as the de facto parent doctrine, in 
                                                 
220 See Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 570 (Ky. 2010) (reasoning the biological 
parent waived her superior right when she brought in a non-biological parent, thereby 
giving the non-biological parent standing to seek custody). 
221 Compare supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing states that have not 
enacted the UPA but have enacted broad custodial statutes because they are not limited by 
the UPA), with supra notes 33–41 (detailing the provisions of the UPA that limit the 
definition of legal parents). 
222 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing for non-biological individuals 
to seek custody); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to 
seek custody).  But see, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007) (refusing to 
allow a non-biological mother to gain custody because of the enactment of the UPA). 
223 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (limiting non-parental custody to instances 
when there is a substantial harm to the child). 
224 See, e.g., supra note 102 (discussing Louisiana’s statute, which requires a legal parent to 
have a biological or adoptive link). 
225 See supra note 99 (explaining how Louisiana has extremely limited the ability of non-
biological parents in a same-sex relationship to seek custody because of its statutory 
language).  Similar to Louisiana, states enacting the UPA have also limited the language of 
the UPA by including marital terms.  See supra note 80 (discussing how Missouri, Ohio, and 
Utah have enacted their UPA by imposing marital requirements for the presumption 
provision of section 703).  This is contrary to the UPA’s purpose.  See supra note 30 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of the UPA was to create equality among 
marital and non-marital children). 
226 See supra note 99 (explaining how Louisiana has narrowly defined parent and how its 
custody statutes foreclose the ability for a non-biological parent to obtain custody). 
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accordance with the legislatures’ will.227  As a result, non-biological 
parents in same-sex relationships have remarkably limited avenues to 
establish themselves as a parent in comparison to the UPA, because the 
UPA allows for greater presumptions of parentage without 
consideration of marital status.228  Thus, when a state statute uses 
marriage as a way to define a parent, it unjustly eliminates any 
possibility for a non-biological parent to obtain custody over a child.229  
In addition to narrowly defining parenting statutes, these states adhere 
to a traditional standard of parenting based on biology.230 
As a counter argument to the granting of same-sex couples parenting 
rights, some states see the biological parent as having paramount rights, 
which can only be interrupted in limited and exceptional 
circumstances.231  This principal is problematic because it will only grant 
a non-biological parent legal rights when the biological parent creates a 
substantial harm for the child; therefore, both individuals in a same-sex 
couple are unable to be recognized as a legal parent.232  By adhering to 
such a traditional and archaic view of parenting and family, these states 
limit the ability for any third party to seek custody of a child despite 
acting as a parent in every way.233  In enacting such statutes, these states 
perpetuate the belief that individuals in same-sex relationships are 
unable to parent.234  Further, these archaic statutes promote an idea of 
                                                 
227 Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (explaining its refusal to grant de facto parental status, because 
the legislature clearly did not intend for such an interpretation based on its parenting 
statutes). 
228 Id. 
229 See supra note 78 (illustrating how marital language may foreclose the ability of a non-
biological parent in a same-sex relationship to establish parentage since the presumption 
provision cannot apply to relationships that are not legalized in that state). 
230 Id. 
231 See supra note 99 (explaining how some states have a heightened view of superior 
natural parenting rights, and, therefore, these courts are unwilling to grant non-biological 
parents legal rights without a showing of substantial harm). 
232 Compare supra note 135 (explaining how a court rationalized its decision when a 
biological parent consented and intended for another individual to help parent, and thus 
the biological parent waived superior title as a parent, and the two parents were to have 
joint custody over the child), with supra note 141 (explaining how some courts may 
heighten this paramount parental right to prohibit joint custody with a non-biological 
parent). 
233 See supra note 140 (discussing a case in which a Louisiana court denied a non-
biological parent rights to her child, because the biological mother had a superior right that 
could not be interfered with without a showing of substantial harm). 
234 See ElHage, supra note 143, at 2 (advancing policy arguments for the adherence to a 
traditional family structure of both a mother and father).  Despite arguments that children 
are best raised in these “traditional” families, studies show that the modern family is not 
composed of these old notions of family; in addition, homosexual parents are capable of 
raising functioning children.  See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of 
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family—a male and female married with children—that is no longer the 
norm.235  As these states refuse to redefine a family, same-sex couples 
will likely never have the same legal rights as a traditional family.236 
By assessing the benefits and limitations of the UPA in comparison 
to states that have chosen not to enact the UPA, it is clear that changes to 
the current version of the UPA are necessary to protect the rights of non-
biological parents of a same-sex relationship.237  Moreover, granting legal 
status to a non-biological parent protects the legal rights of a child.238  
The UPA intended to protect the legal rights of children born out of 
marriage, but, because of its current language, it fails to protect children 
born in same-sex relationships, resulting in both the parent and child 
being denied certain legal rights.239 
States are divided in applying the de facto parent doctrine because 
the UPA has not explicitly recognized the doctrine.240  Moreover, the 
gender-specific and heterosexual language of the UPA makes it 
inapplicable to same-sex couples.241  Although the UPA is not binding 
and not all states have enacted it, amending the UPA in consideration of 
these deficiencies to protect same-sex couples will provide future 
legislatures guidance in defining parent to include parents in non-
traditional families.242  Because states look to the UPA in composing their 
                                                                                                             
Children by Gay and Lesbian Parents § 3 (2001) (discussing research on same-sex couples 
raising children). 
235 See Meyers, supra note 31, at 132 (discussing how the idea of “traditional families” has 
changed and that traditional marriage is no longer a societal norm).  The “traditional 
family”—a married heterosexual couple raising children—has decreased from forty 
percent in 1970 to less than twenty-five percent in 2000.  Id. 
236 See, e.g., White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (strictly enforcing 
Missouri’s enactment of the UPA and refusing to extend the presumption provisions to a 
female in a same-sex relationship because of the gender-specific marital language and the 
additional marital requirement for a presumption of paternity). 
237 See supra Part III.A.2 (illustrating the overwhelming limitations of the UPA when 
applied to same-sex couples). 
238 See supra note 23 (illustrating the numerous legal rights, like inheritance, a child is 
entitled to from a legal parent, as well as the overall emotional factors in separating a child 
from a parent who has raised him or her). 
239 See Miller, supra note 4, at 81 (explaining that the failure to establish a legal parent-
child relationship results in a child being unable to benefit from Social Security and life 
insurance benefits, unable to file a wrongful death lawsuit, and unable to inherit through 
intestacy). 
240 Compare supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware’s enactment 
of the UPA to include de facto parent, despite the UPA not recognizing such), with supra 
notes 124–27 and accompanying text (exploring how states enacting the UPA have refused 
to recognize the de facto parent doctrine because the UPA has not explicitly recognized it). 
241 See supra note 24 (asserting that the UPA is influential as a guiding source for 
legislatures and courts to define parent within various statutes). 
242 See id. (noting that the UPA is influential as a guiding source for legislatures and 
courts to define parent within their statutes); see also Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 819 
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own statutes regarding the definition of parent, amending the UPA with 
these considerations in mind will enable states to better combat issues 
regarding the legal parental status of a non-biological parent in a same-
sex relationship.243 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
As has been discussed, there is no uniformity among states in the 
determination of legal rights for a non-biological parent over a child 
conceived in a same-sex relationship.244  Status as a legal parent triggers 
many legal rights and entitlements for both parent and child.245  State 
uniformity in parenting and child custody laws is essential as society is 
increasingly mobile.246  Furthermore, lack of uniformity among states 
essentially forces same-sex couples to reside in a state based on the 
applicable parenting laws.247  Because the UPA does not protect non-
biological parents of same-sex couples, the UPA should be amended.248  
The following amendments to the UPA will result in a greater 
application of the UPA and correct the deficiencies of the current 
version.  Therefore, this Note recommends modifications to three specific 
UPA provisions:  section 201, section 204, and section 703.249  Amending 
these sections is the first step in guiding states’ legislatures to construct 
statutes that are inclusive for non-biological parents of same-sex 
relationships in states already enacting the UPA, as well as in states not 
enacting the UPA needing assistance in such issues.250 
                                                                                                             
(Utah 2007) (refusing to apply the de facto parent doctrine because the legislature did not 
include such in its enactment of the UPA). 
243 See infra Part IV (commenting on the proposed amendments’ effect on parents in a 
same-sex relationship). 
244 See supra Part II.B, Part II.C (discussing the legislative and judicial approaches taken 
by states in determining legal parental status). 
245 See supra note 23 (exploring the legal rights associated with the establishment of a 
legal parent-child relationship). 
246 Miller, supra note 4, at 72–73 (discussing the lack of uniformity in court decisions for 
custody and visitation, which results in uncertainty for non-traditional families). 
247 Id. at 79 (explaining that same-sex parents may need to consider the state they reside 
in or plan to move based on such laws in order to protect their families). 
248 See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the limitations of the UPA because it is inapplicable to 
parents of same-sex relationships). 
249 See infra Part IV (amending sections 201, 204, and 703 of the current UPA). 
250 See infra Part IV (commenting on the advantages of the amendments to the UPA 
provisions). 
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A. Proposed Amendment to Section 201 to Define De Facto Parent as a Legal 
Parent 
First, this Note proposes an amendment to section 201 of the UPA to 
more adequately define the legal parent-child relationship.251  In its 
current form, the provision only permits a mother-child relationship to 
be established by birth or adoption, whereas it allows a legal father-child 
relationship to be established by subsequent presumption provisions.252  
The proposed amendment to the section reads as follows: 
Section 201-Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship 
(a) The mother-child relationship is established 
between a woman and child by: 
(1) the woman’s having given birth to the child [, 
except as otherwise provided in [Article] 8]; 
(2) an unrebutted presumption of the parentage of the 
child under section 204; 
(3) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity; [or] 
(4) adoption of the child by the woman [; or 
(5) an adjudication confirming the woman as a 
parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the 
agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is 
enforceable under other law];  
(6) having consented to assisted reproduction under 
[Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of a child [;or 
(7) a determination by the court, based on clear and 
convincing evidence, that the woman is a de facto parent 
of the child, as established by section 201(c). 
(b) The father-child relationship is established between 
a man and a child by: 
(1) an unrebutted presumption of the man’s 
paternity parentage of the child under section 204; 
(2) an effective acknowledgment of paternity by the 
man under [Article] 3, unless the acknowledgement 
has been rescinded or successfully challenged; 
(3) an adjudication of the man’s paternity; 
(4) adoption of the child by the man; [or] 
(5) the man’s having consented to assisted 
reproduction by a woman under [Article] 7 which 
resulted in the birth of the child [;or 
                                                 
251 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). 
252 Id. 
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(6) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent 
of a child born to a gestational mother if the 
agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is 
enforceable under other law]; or 
(7) a determination by the court, based on clear and 
convincing evidence, that the man is a de facto parent of 
the child, as established by section 201(c). 
(c) De facto parental status is established, if determined by 
the court, with clear and convincing evidence, that an 
individual: 
(1) has had the support and consent of the child’s 
biological or adoptive parent(s) who intended to foster the 
formation and establishment of the parent-like 
relationship between the child and the de facto parent; 
(2) has exercised parental responsibility for the child as a 
sole primary caregiver or as a joint caregiver in 
conjunction with another legal parent; 
(3) has acted in a parental role for a length of time 
sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent 
relationship that is parental in nature, greater than a 
period of one year. 
(d) Establishment of parentage based on one of the above 
methods is no greater or lesser in status as a legal parent, and 
all are considered as equal legal parental statuses in the eyes of 
the court in determination of custody or other legal matters 
regarding the child. Establishment of a de facto parent does 
not terminate the legal relationship of a biological or adoptive 
parent.253 
Commentary 
The modification to this provision corrects three deficiencies within 
the current UPA.  First, it expands the definition of a legal mother-child 
relationship.  The original UPA only permits a legal mother-child 
relationship to be established through birth or legal adoption, whereas it 
allows for a male to be presumed the father without a biological or 
adoptive link.254  As a result, non-biological mothers in same-sex 
                                                 
253 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and 
have been influenced by Delaware’s enactment of the UPA.  The unitalicized portions are 
modeled after the original UPA.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002), 
9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009). 
254 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). 
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relationships are at a disadvantage.255  Amending the provision to 
include the presumption of parentage already available for males allows 
for a female non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship to be 
established as a legal parent. 
Second, this amendment removes the gender-specific language of 
the current UPA.  Under the current UPA, section 201 defines the legal 
parental relationship, referencing subsequent presumption provisions.256  
The presumption provisions are only applicable to a male in a 
heterosexual relationship.257  Taken as a whole, the provisions together 
do not apply to same-sex relationships.258  Therefore, it is necessary to 
amend this definitional provision to include gender-neutral terms in 
order to modify the subsequent presumption provisions, ensuring they 
are also gender-neutral.  As a result, all the provisions can apply to either 
gender, as well as to same-sex couples.259 
Finally, and most importantly, this amendment explicitly defines a 
de facto parent as a legal parent and sets the requirements necessary to 
establish this legal relationship.  It is crucial to define a de facto parent as 
a legal parent to avoid judicial confusion in granting such an equitable 
remedy.260  This addition of the de facto parent takes into consideration 
limitations set by other de facto statutes, including the legal rights of the 
biological or adoptive parent.261  The definition of a de facto parent 
requires evidence that the biological or adoptive parent intended to 
create this relationship.  Therefore, the definition of a de facto parent is 
limited and cannot apply to any adult individual having an influential 
relationship over a child.  Further considering the rights of a biological or 
adoptive parent, the legal recognition of a non-biological parent as a de 
facto parent will not terminate the legal rights of a natural or adoptive 
                                                 
255 See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text (explaining that one limitation of the 
UPA is that it only allows for a presumption of paternity and does not allow a mother-child 
relationship to be established through a presumption). 
256 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). 
257 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). 
258 See supra notes 192–93 (discussing the inapplicability of the UPA’s presumption 
provisions to female same-sex couples). 
259 See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and Lesbian 
Parents § 3 (2001) (explaining studies have shown that same-sex parents are comparable in 
parenting to heterosexual parents). 
260 See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply the de facto 
parent doctrine to same-sex couples because the legislature did not explicitly recognize the 
doctrine); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818 (Utah 2007) (refusing to apply the de facto 
parent doctrine because it conflicted with statutory law). 
261 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (requiring the de facto parent to show 
the relationship was established with the support and consent of the parents, thereby 
limiting the amount of individuals who can claim this status). 
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parent, merely allowing for a joint parental relationship.262  The 
definition allows for joint custody between the non-biological parent and 
the biological parent in a same-sex relationship, comparable to second 
parent adoption.263 
B. Proposed Amendment to Section 204 to Include a Gender–Neutral 
Presumption of Parentage  and Legalized Same-Sex Relationships 
Next, this Note proposes an amendment to section 204 of the UPA.  
In its current form, this provision provides for the presumption of 
paternity in certain circumstances, including marriage to the biological 
mother, regardless of whether the man is the biological or adoptive 
father.264  Therefore, the recommended amendments for this provision 
extend the presumption to both genders.  Further, it takes into 
consideration same-sex relationships in granting this presumption by 
recognizing domestic partnerships and civil unions.  The proposed 
amendment to the section reads as follows: 
Section 204-Presumption of Paternity Parentage 
(a) a man an individual  is presumed to be the father legal 
parent of a child if: 
(1) he that individual and the biological mother or 
father of the child are married to each other, or in a 
domestic partnership or civil union, as recognized by state 
law, and the child is born during the marriage that 
legal relationship; 
(2) he that individual and the biological mother or 
father of the child were married to each other, or in a 
domestic partnership or civil union, as recognized by state 
law, and the child is born within 300 days after the 
marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union is 
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, or divorce[, or after a decree of 
separation]; 
(3) before the birth of the child, he that individual 
and the mother or father of the child were married to, 
                                                 
262 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005) (explaining that de facto 
parental status “do[es] not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal 
parent in the family unit” because it allows for joint custodial status). 
263 See supra note 5 (discussing the definition of second parent adoption, which allows for 
joint parental status between biological and non-biological parents in a same-sex 
relationship). 
264 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012). 
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or in a domestic partnership or civil union with,  each 
other in apparent compliance with law, even if the 
attempted marriage, domestic partnership, or civil 
union is or could be declared invalid, and the child is 
born during the invalid marriage, domestic 
partnership, or civil union, or within 300 days after its 
termination by death, annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, or divorce[, or after a decree of 
separation]; 
(4) after the birth of the child, he that individual and 
the biological mother or father of the child each 
married, in a domestic partnership or civil union with, 
each other in apparent compliance with the law, 
whether or not the marriage, domestic partnership, or 
civil union is or could be declared invalid, and the 
individual voluntarily asserted parentage of the child, 
and; 
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state 
agency maintaining birth records]; 
(B)  he that individual agreed to be and is named 
as the child’s father parent on the child’s birth 
certificate; or  
(C)  he that individual promised in a record to 
support the child as his or her own. 
(5) for the first two years of the child’s life, he 
resided in the same household with the child and 
openly held out the child as his own  
(b) a presumption of parentage will establish an individual as 
a legal parent in the eyes of the court.265 
Commentary 
The current language of the UPA is gender-specific and does not 
consider same-sex relationships; therefore, it only applies to males in a 
heterosexual relationship.266  Amending this section to be gender–
neutral, as well as inclusive of domestic partnerships and civil unions, 
                                                 
265 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and 
have been influenced by Washington’s enactment of the UPA.  The unitalicized portions 
are modeled after the original UPA.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.101 et seq. (West 2005). 
266 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when the father is married to the mother of 
the child). 
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extends the presumption of marriage to both genders and same-sex 
relationships.267  Section 204(a) has been eliminated because it is no 
longer necessary with the inclusion of the de facto parent doctrine under 
section 201.268  These amendments to this provision will remedy the 
deficiencies of the current UPA because it allows the presumption of 
parentage within a marriage to be extended to same-sex couples in a 
legal union—domestic partnership or civil union.269 
C. Proposed Amendment to Section 703 to Include a Gender–Neutral 
Presumption of Parentage  Within Artificial Reproduction 
Finally, the Note proposes amendments to section 703 of the UPA, 
which will correct deficiencies in the current UPA.  This provision allows 
a male to be a presumed legal father over a child when he consents to the 
artificial reproduction of the female and intends to parent the child.270  
As it currently stands, the provision can only apply to males in a 
heterosexual relationship.271  The proposed amendment to the section 
reads as follows: 
Section 703-Paternity Parentage of Child of Assisted Reproduction 
A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction by a woman as provided by Section 704 
with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent 
of the resulting child. 
A person who biologically provides for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction with another person, regardless of gender, with 
the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the 
resulting child. Such consent and intent to be the parent is 
sufficient to establish legal parentage status equivalent to the 
biological parent of such child in the eyes of the law.272  
                                                 
267 See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the limitations of the current UPA, which arise 
because of its gender-specific language). 
268 See supra note 171 (comparing the UPA’s presumption provision to the ALI’s 
definition of de facto parent). 
269 See supra note 3 (discussing the states that have legalized domestic partnerships and 
civil unions for same-sex couples). 
270 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (explaining the presumption of paternity 
available under the current version of the UPA when a male consents and intends to be the 
father of a child conceived through artificial insemination, which is not available to 
establish a legally recognized mother-child relationship). 
271 Id.  See also supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of 
the gender-specific language of section 703 of the UPA). 
272 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and 
have been influenced by Washington’s enactment of the UPA.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 25
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/25
2013] A Mother Yesterday, but Not Today 583 
Commentary 
Although the UPA recognizes couples that use artificial 
insemination, including situations in which a third party’s sperm is 
donated, the current language of the UPA fails to consider same-sex 
couples that use a similar procedure.273  Under the current language, 
when a lesbian couple conceives a child through artificial insemination, 
the non-biological mother will not be able to establish a presumed legal 
relationship.274  By amending the language of the current UPA to include 
gender-neutral language, it will be applicable to same-sex couples and 
provide a presumption of maternity for non-biological parents in same-
sex relationships.275  
V.  CONCLUSION 
A parent’s legal status implicates numerous legal benefits for both 
the parent and child, including inheritance, medical decisions, and most 
importantly custody.  The number of same-sex couples starting families 
through adoption or artificial reproduction is increasing.276  Same-sex 
couples are severely disadvantaged in establishing parenting rights, 
because the majority of states do not legally recognize same-sex marriage 
or second parent adoptions.  Of greater importance, the risk for a non-
biological or non-adoptive parent of losing custody over a child he or she 
has raised and loved over many years is of grave consequence for both 
parent and child. 
The UPA is highly influential when states choose to enact statutes 
regarding parentage.  The UPA was intended to create equality among 
children born in and out of marriage.  Although it achieves this purpose 
in regards to heterosexual parents, the UPA does not create equality 
among parents in a same-sex relationship because of its gender specific 
                                                                                                             
§ 26.26.710 (West 2005).  The unitalicized portions are modeled after the original UPA.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). 
273 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012); see 
supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (explaining that the gender-specific language 
precludes a female from being a presumed parent under section 703); see also supra note 177 
and accompanying text (discussing that section 703 can only be beneficial to same-sex 
couples if it is applied without considering gender). 
274 See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (illustrating the limitations of the 
current UPA, because the provision will not apply in its current form with gender-specific 
language to a female attempting to establish parentage). 
275 Id. 
276 Gary Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, WILLIAMS 
INST. (Jan. 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-
demographics-studies/family-formation-and-raising-children-among-same-sex-couples/.  
In the 2000 Census, approximately 63,000 same-sex couples were raising children, and this 
number has grown to 110,000.  Id. 
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language.  As previously explained, states that have enacted the UPA, as 
well as states that have not enacted it, greatly differ in statutory 
language, thereby causing inconsistency among states in the granting of 
parental rights for non-biological parents.  In addition, some courts are 
not willing to extend equitable remedies, like de facto parenting, because 
of the narrow language of their statutes.  Consequently, non-biological 
parents of same-sex couples have limited options if they want to gain 
legal parental status over their child. 
As a result of these limitations, it is essential that the current version 
of the UPA be amended to consider non-traditional families—like same-
sex couples.  By amending the UPA, states will have better guidance in 
creating their own statutes for defining a de facto parent.  In addition, 
amending the UPA to clearly allow same-sex couples to establish 
parenting status gives states greater clarity when faced with the issue of 
a non-biological parent establishing custodial rights. 
Returning to the hypothetical described at the beginning of this 
Note:  under the current version of the UPA, Marcie is unable to 
establish herself as a legal parent although she and Emma created a 
family together.277  Marcie was a parent—she loved, supported, and 
provided for her three children.  Yet, under the current law, Marcie will 
not be recognized as a parent.  In many states, she will lose her children 
and status as a mother merely because of her sexual orientation.  
However, Marcie would be protected as a legal parent if states enact the 
UPA with this Note’s proposed amendments.  Thus, equality compels 
the UPA to modernize its language and expand its definition of 
“parent.” 
Jennifer Sroka* 
                                                 
277 See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical, based on a recent Ohio case, in which a 
non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship was denied legal parental status over the 
children raised by the couple together, and therefore she lost custody of her children). 
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